East-West detente was hotly debated during its heyday in the 1970s. Critics saw it as a form of appeasement which, they claimed, strengthened communism while weakening the West. Supporters saw it variously as a means of reducing the danger of war, subverting communism and, in Europe, bridging the division of the continent.

This book presents a balanced assessment of the reality of detente, and of the different interests involved, looking back through the eyes of expert contributors from Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Poland, Hungary and Austria. It takes a particularly close look at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which produced the Helsinki Final Act and a series of follow-up measures that continue to evolve to the present day. It argues that, in negotiating the text of the Final Act, the West won a victory that was insufficiently recognized at the time. Davy concludes that detente was ambiguous, conferring short-term political and economic benefits on East European regimes while at the same time weakening their foundations and contributing to their collapse in 1989. European Detente will be of interest to students, academics and practitioners in international relations, strategic studies and international politics, particularly those specializing in Eastern Europe.