Optimal sanctions when individuals are imperfectly informed about the probability of apprehension

Optimal sanctions when individuals are imperf ...
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Lucian A. B ...
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Last edited by WorkBot
December 15, 2009 | History

Optimal sanctions when individuals are imperfectly informed about the probability of apprehension

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Publish Date
Language
English

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Edition Availability
Cover of: Optimal sanctions when individuals are imperfectly informed about the probability of apprehension

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Book Details


Edition Notes

"May 1992."

Includes bibliographical references (p. 7).

Binghamton University Libraries' copy bound with: Do doctoral students' financial support patterns affect their time-to-degree and completion probabilities.

Published in
Cambridge, MA (1050 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge 02138)
Series
NBER working papers series -- working paper no. 4079, Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) -- working paper no. 4079.

The Physical Object

Pagination
7 p. ;

ID Numbers

Open Library
OL22439188M

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December 15, 2009 Edited by WorkBot link works
November 13, 2008 Created by ImportBot Imported from Binghamton University MARC record