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"Abstract: This essay revisits the question of instrument choice for the regulation of externalities in the context of climate change. The central point is that the Pigouvian prescription to equate marginal control costs with the expected marginal benefits of damage reduction should guide the design of both carbon taxes and permit schemes. Because expected marginal damage rises nonlinearly, a corresponding nonlinear tax -- or an equivalent price implemented through a quantity-adjusted permit scheme -- is second best. Also considered are political factors, distinctive features of regulating a stock pollutant, and ex ante distortions due to the anticipation of transition relief (such as by receiving more free permits for greater emissions). Finally, distributive concerns are examined, with emphasis on the conceptual and practical benefits of addressing distributive issues with the tax and transfer system rather through adjustments to regulatory schemes that usually render them less effective"--John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business web site.
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Taxes, permits, and climate change
2010, National Bureau of Economic Research
electronic resource /
in English
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Title from PDF file as viewed on 8/20/2010.
Includes bibliographical references.
Also available in print.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
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- Created November 9, 2010
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September 25, 2020 | Edited by MARC Bot | import existing book |
August 4, 2012 | Edited by VacuumBot | Updated format '[electronic resource] /' to 'Electronic resource' |
November 9, 2010 | Created by ImportBot | Imported from Library of Congress MARC record |