Written by Bernie Weisz Historian-Vietnam War November 17, 201 0 Pembroke Pines, Florida U.S.A E mail: BernWei1@aol.com
Title of Review: The Insanity of Vietnam: Spending Money And Lives To Take A Ridge Or Hill Just To Give It Back To The Enemy!
Joel Russell's book "Escaping Death's Sting" is quite unlike any Vietnam memoir you will ever come across. This memoir chronicles the author subjected to sexual abuse as a juvenile, a torturous ordeal in basic training, watching his outfit in four hours go from 250 to 79 men in Vietnam's sweltering jungles, and ends with Russell's manic episodes struggling with P.T.S.D and Christianity. It is the rare individual that can undergo what Russell experienced and maintain their sanity. Nevertheless, this book is brimming with facts about the American ordeal in South Vietnam, focusing on the worst year of the conflict, i.e. the "Tet Offensive" and 1968. While this is the story of Russell's entire life, half of the book is about his two years in the U.S. Marine Corps during 1968, where 16,592 Americans were killed, and 1969, which took the lives of 11,616 U.S. Troops. Russell admits in the preface that he is Bipolar and was adversely affected by "Post Traumatic Stress Disorder" (PTSD). He was in the front lines as a Marine during the May 28, 1968 battle of "Fox Trot Ridge" as well as Khe Sanh.The book chronicles his return to an ungrateful nation, his drug use, conversion to Christianity, and issues with psychotropic medication, sanity and PTSD. Towards the end of the book, the reader can't be sure if it is Russell's thoughts, religious indoctrination or just PTSD distorted ranting's adversely affected by Bipolar ideation. Regardless, this book is full of historical gems worthy of reading, leaving the reader with a very valuable and informative Vietnam War memoir full of information never to be found in the standard American history textbook relating to this conflict.

While the Tet offensive was unfolding, Russell and the 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines, known as the acronym "2/3", were assigned duty east of Khe Sanh as a blocking force against the NVA, sweeping right towards his unit. With a company of 250 Marines, Russell's group was helicoptered into an area for a combat assault. Russell mused: "we landed in a nice quiet spot, Things quieted down after the choppers left, but then, all hell broke loose. We were still taking positions when the air suddenly exploded with machine gun fire. It was soon joined by the sound of rockets exploding all around us. There were men lying and screaming in pain and dying right next to me. Four hours later, there were only 79 of us remaining alive in the company. When things finally cooled down, I was given the job of loading the dead and wounded onto choppers. We carried them in ponchos and body bags. The stench of death was everywhere." There was the belief in the Vietnam War among Grunts that if you were going to get killed, it was usually when you first got there or when you were "short" (when it was almost time to go home). Russell prayed the following after this battle: "Lord, if you are going to take me, take me quick! Don't make me go through all this hell and then take me." The Lord was far from finished with this author, as readers will see. At both the battle of Khe Sanh, and the aforementioned skirmish, Russell attributed American deaths to malfunctioning M-16's. The 2/3, because of KIA/WIA attrition, was replaced by the 27th Marine Division. It is historically significant to quote Russell's reaction: "The 27th Marine Division brought over M-14 rifles with them. The M-14 was not available to us when we got in country."

Joel Russell at the outset explains that the reason he penned this book was to heal his damaged mind and heart, qualifying that while thirteen months in Vietnam was a lifetime to most who served in that inferno, to him it was an eternity. Born in 1948 as the eleventh of twelve children, religion was always in the background for Russell. He had attended several Catholic schools and at thirteen seriously contemplated joining the priesthood. Disaster followed him around during his young adulthood in Ohio, nearly drowning at age 8 and being raped by a drunk pervert when he turned 10. After a traumatic incident whereupon Russell went on a field trip with his high school biology teacher and several students to see a football game in a different town in the middle of winter and was left behind, he quit high school. While his family moved to Seattle, Washington, and one of his brothers had a mental breakdown, Russell found himself without room, board and job. Russell wrote: "Having no job, I decided it was time to get my military service commitment out of the way. I was too young for the bars and had already had a taste of that lifestyle, and I liked it. So, like an idiot, I joined the United States Marine Corps." At Marine Corps Recruit Depot in San Diego, California, Russell was called a maggot, threatened to be locked up in a "fat farm", woken up at 4 am with a 35 gallon garbage can thrown down the middle of the barracks every morning, and reflected as follows: "After being terrorized to a state of numbness, I knew for sure that I had made the biggest mistake of my life and I didn't quite know what to do about it." Claiming that he was set up with a dirty rifle to intentionally fail graduating from Basic Training, he was placed in a living hell called "Correctional Custody Platoon." With endless running, torturous drills and humiliation, his drill instructor told him to "squat thrust forever." At one point, Russell fell of a high rope beam, tumbling 30 feet and breaking an ankle. Russell reflected on his basic training, which he had to repeat twice as such: "Oh my God! It's not a bad dream. It won't go away!"

Regardless, Russell did graduate from Basic Training and next went to Camp Pendleton, California for Infantry Training Regiment (ITR). Russell reflected at this next stop: "There, I continued my instruction on how to kill, maim, or wound my fellow man. I was learning basic warfare moves and the do's and do not's of jungle warfare. Although Russell knew that despite the fact that he had not received any orders for a destination in S.E. Asia, he was in a state of denial: "My mind refused to accept that I just might be heading for Vietnam." He should have realized this was an undeniable certainty, with the war at it's apex, and his "Military Occupational Specialty" (MOS) being rockets, 105 howitzers, demolition and explosives. After seeing 95% of Pendleton's ITR graduates sent directly to Vietnam, he realized the reality of his situation. Waking up and smelling the coffee, Russell wrote: "I don't remember signing up to go to Vietnam! What did I get myself into? What have I done? What about Hawaii? Yeah, I am going to go to Hawaii, but only to refuel the jet that was going to cross the ocean, to Vietnam. Oh God, what have I done?" Russell did graduate form ITR and was promptly dispatched to Vietnam via the twentieth century war chariot, a commercial airplane. With the Tet Offensive unraveling in Vietnam, Russell departed Pendleton. With a two hour layover in Hawaii, a 14 hour flight to Okinawa, Russell had an Oriental five day layover and caroused the streets of "Sin City." This was Okinawa's "Red Light" district, where for five dollars, Russell lost his virginity to a cheap prostitute. Four decades later, Russell wrote in this book:" If I had to do it over again, I think I would save myself for marriage. The guilt and shame just wasn't worth it to me."

As in most other Vietnam memoirs, Russell's reaction to his arrival, in Danang, was typical. He penned the following thoughts: "The plane made a good target, landing at the airport at Danang. I noticed that the temperature seemed to get hotter as we landed. I had orders to report to the 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines. The plane finally rolled to a stop at the terminal. I had come to a type of hell. I took in a breath of hot air. I remember thinking, Jesus is it hot out there! I knew instantly that I had made the biggest mistake of my short life." In Danang, Russell wrote that he reported to an Australian, being a foreign exchange captain. In a way, Russell found it a relief to be in Vietnam and out of Basic Training harassment, issuing the following thoughts: "At least I could have a conversation without someone jumping on my case. Even the officers cut out the bull crap. We all were heavily armed and would not take any guff from anyone. No one was going to make me run up any hill just to amuse themselves." The 2nd battalion, 3rd Marines that Russell had just become part of, was battle hardened. Prior to Russell's arrival, the 2/3 had been in fierce hand-to-hand fixed bayonet combat when the North Vietnamese made what was known as "human wave" assaults and tried to overrun their positions at Khe Sanh. In just a few hours, the 2/3 went from 200 Marines to 80, with the M-16 being castigated for jamming at crucial moments. A "human wave" attack was a North Vietnamese offensive infantry tactic, in which the Communists conducted an unprotected frontal assault with densely concentrated infantry formations against the American line, intending to overrun the defenders by engaging in knock-down-drag-out combat. The goal was to maneuver as many men as possible into the donnybrook, hoping that the shock from a large mass of attackers engaged in the fracas would force the American forces to disintegrate or fall back.

The human wave attack's reliance on brouhaha combat usually made the skills of individual soldiers irrelevant, but required great physical courage, coercion and esprit de corps for the NVA to advance into devastating American firepower. For the human wave attack to succeed, it was imperative for the attackers to charge into the U.S. line in the shortest time and in the greatest number possible, so that a sufficient mass can be preserved when the attackers reached combat range. However, Russell went to great lengths pointing out that the American M-16 had jammed on desperate Marines, with deadly consequences. Russell was an "ammo humper, carrying 7 rounds in his rucksack that weighed 6 pounds a piece. The 2/3 had a reputation as a "rent a battalion," being sent wherever the action was at that particular time. On Russell's first patrol, humping 60 pounds of ammo on his back right outside his base at Marble mountain, he wrote the following: "I quickly became totally soaked with sweat from grunting around the heavy pack full of mortars, ammo and food. I now understood how the grunts got their name. We hiked endless miles through jungle, sand, and then through flooded rice paddies."
On his second patrol, Russell watched a Marine step on a booby trap. He lamented: "I heard a loud explosion go off and the company hit the ground thinking it was an ambush. Sadly, the point man had stepped on a booby trap and had his foot blown off. His screams of anguish were almost too awful to bear."

Joel Russell arrived in the jungles of the northern part of South Vietnam in January, 1968. Two months prior to that (November of 1967), the Lyndon B. Johnson administration in Washington launched an extensive "public relations" campaign designed to convince Congress, the press, and the public that there was "progress" in Vietnam and that the war was being "won." Johnson was advised to emphasize to the American public the "light at the end of the tunnel" instead of battles, deaths, and danger. To head this effort, Johnson brought General William Westmoreland, commander of American forces in Vietnam, to Washington. Westmoreland addressed the National Press Club saying that the U.S. had reached the point "where the end comes into view." As a response, American support of L.B.J. rose. The effects of this effort would be short-lived. On January 21, 1968, as Russell and his 2/3 Marines battled "wait a minute vines" in the sweltering South Vietnamese jungles, North Vietnamese regular forces launched an attack on Khe Sanh, a remote outpost. The attack conjured up fears, especially for LBJ, of the 1954 French debacle and humiliating defeat at "Dien Bien Phu." American forces were ordered to hold the base, regardless of human costs. The siege lasted for over two months and the North Vietnamese were eventually turned back after the base was reinforced in April of 1968. Khe Sanh was just a prelude. On January 31st, 1968, the NVA and the Viet Cong launched what came to be called the TET (New Year) offensive. They jointly attacked over 100 cities in South Vietnam including 35 of 44 provincial capitals. The offensive included Saigon, the South Vietnamese capital, as Viet Cong guerillas penetrated the U.S. Embassy compound.

The TET offensive came as a complete shock to America. Critics of the war argued how could the enemy mount such a campaign if the war was being won? The fighting continued into February. In January 1968, the number of US troops killed in action was 1,163; the death toll increased to 2,197 the next month. In the next 90 days, another 5,000 would loose their lives in battle. TET also elevated a debate that began early in the war. Since Vietnam was the first televised or "living room" war, each evening the networks would show films of the fighting that was gruesome. Unlike the practice during World War II, the film was neither censored nor subject to any systematic scrutiny by the government. America witnessed in vivid color scenes of battles in progress, the dead and wounded, and the coffins of the dead being unloaded. One of the more shocking photographs of the war occurred during the TET offensive. A Viet Cong terrorist was captured by South Vietnamese military officials and summarily executed in the streets of Saigon. The anchorman for the CBS, Walter Cronkite traveled to Vietnam in February, 1968 and filed several reports. Upon his return, Cronkite took an unprecedented step of presenting his "editorial opinion" at the end of the news broadcast on February 27th. "For it seems now more certain than ever," Cronkite said, "that the bloody experience of Vietnam is to end in a stalemate." After watching Cronkite's broadcast, LBJ was quoted as saying. "That's it. If I've lost Cronkite, I've lost middle America." The TET Offensive remains a matter of controversy to this day. Militarily, the American forces repelled the attacks and retook the cities initially occupied by the NVA and VC. Critics argue that this was not emphasized in media reports so that TET suffered from biased "yellow journalism" and was unfairly interpreted as a "psychological defeat." Others assert that TET had a substantial impact on American public opinion because of the disconnectedness between the optimism of the administration's public relations in late 1967 and the coordinated enemy attacks of January-February 1968.

While the Tet Offensive was unfolding, Russell and the 2/3 Marines were known as a "rent a battalion" i.e. being sent in wherever the hottest action was to block the NVA advance. With the NVA coming headlong at the 2/3 division, Russell's Company of 250 men were helicoptered in as part of a combat assault to block the Communists. Russell described what happened next: "The company was loaded about a fleet of helicopters and we were flown into the combat zone. We landed in a nice, quiet spot. Things quieted down after the choppers left, but then all hell broke loose. We were still taking positions when the air suddenly exploded with machine gun fire. It was soon joined by the sound of rockets exploding all around us. Four hours later, there were 79 of us remaining alive in the company. When things finally cooled down, I was given the lousy job of loading the dead and wounded onto choppers. We carried them in ponchos and body bags. The stench of death was everywhere." During the Vietnam War, it was thought by grunts that if you were going to get killed, it was usually while you were an "FNG" (a new guy) or "short" (almost ready for a veteran to go home). Russell prayed at this point the following: "Lord, if you are going to take me, take me quick! Don't make me go through all this hell and then take me." Another factor in the war was promotion. If a man was killed or wounded, he would be replaced by the next experienced man. Since the 2/3 was decimated down to 70 me, they were replaced by the 27th Marine Division fresh from the U.S. It is historically important to note Russell's comment in this book in regard to this event: The 27th Marines brought M-14's with them. The M-14 was not available to us when we got in country. Many of us succeeded in trading the unreliable M-16 for the fully automatic M-14's. Everyone knew that the M-14's wouldn't let you down, even if it was thrown in the mud, which frequently happened. The M-14 was heavy and packed a hell of a wallop, and it was trustworthy. Our guys had been devastated by the unsatisfactory performance of the M-16. At Khe Sanh, the Marines there ended up fighting with bayonets because their rifles would jam and fail them." This raises an interesting issue. Could the end result of the ground war have been different if American forces had armament that equaled or exceeded the performance of the standard North Vietnamese/Viet Cong assault rifle, the Soviet built AK-47?

Russelll's outfit was filled with replacements for the casualties, resupplied, and sent north to Phu Bai, near the coast. Just before reaching Hue, in the middle of dense jungle, Russell was in for a new surprise, endemic to Vietnam: "The vegetation was loaded with horrible leeches. These hungry little devils were waiting to catch a ride with you and suck your blood for dinner." Another incident occurred that Russell noted, one that rarely makes the history books was described as such: "We climbed the mountain just outside Hue City and the temperature soared to over 100 degrees, with high humidity. Four feet in front of me, a large piece of "Friendly Fire" hit a Marine in the eye, caving his face in completely. Blood poured down from his head. I believe that he died instantly. The corpsman bandaged his head, but he knew he was already dead." Friendly fire in Vietnam was when there was an American unintentional firing towards another American while attempting to engage the Communists which inadvertently resulted in injury or death. A death resulting from a negligent discharge was not considered friendly fire, but instead was described as "fragging". Fire aimed at enemy forces that accidentally ended up hitting U.S. forces was exacerbated by the close proximity of combatants, particularly in dense S.E. Asian jungles. The worst case of "friendly fire" in the Vietnam War occurred on May 11, 1969, during the Battle of Hamburger Hill. In that instance, Lt. Col. Weldon Honeycutt directed helicopter gunships, from an Aerial Rocket Artillery (ARA) battery, to support an infantry assault. The helicopters mistook the command post of the 3/187th battalion for a Vietnamese unit and attacked, killing two and wounding thirty-five, including Honeycutt.

As Russell's unit continued to engage in jungle skirmishes, he was wounded in the leg by an NVA thrown grenade, and needed to be evacuated by helicopter to the rear for surgery. It is interesting to note his comments in regards to his near brush with death: "I used to get really angry about being old enough to get killed for my country but not old enough to have a beer with my dad." After recuperating, Russell was owed an R & R, which he choose Australia as his destination. Dreading the fear of a young death, he wanted to be with a Caucasian woman before he met his end. Prior to departure to Sydney, Australia, he commented on his state of mind: "I was only a third of the way through my tour and I had already been wounded! I had been exposed to some of the heaviest fighting of the war and I would give a nickel for what the future was going to be. The odds were not looking good for me to get through the war in one piece. I now understand why some guys made their way to Europe or Canada to find sanctuary. There sure as hell was no sanctuary where I had just come from." What about the women of Vietnam? Russell wrote the following: They were not particularly attractive to me. Many of them had black teeth from chewing betel nut." His description of his R & R in Australia was fascinating. About returning to the war zone after a one week hiatus, Russell remarked: "I was about to re-enter the nightmare that wouldn't go away." Seeing Vietnam from the air right before he landed, he wrote: "Everything was lush green interspersed with lots of brown spots caused by large unexploded bombs."

One week out of the war was enough for Russell's physical endurance to erode. Immediately thrown back into humping mountains in 100 degree heat carrying a 60 lb. pack almost did Russell in. However, Russellhad a new commander that an interesting comment was made about: "Captain Russell (same name as the author) was despised by most of the men. Most thought he was a glory seeker. We thought he might get us all killed because he kept volunteering us for every dangerous mission available. Rich told the captain I was running a 104 degree fever and that he thought I should be medevac'd. The heartless animal could have cared less. He figured that I would probably be alright in a couple of days. The entire platoon thought the captain was a major dog after that. He was a "frag" candidate! Could bad small unit poor leadership be a reason the U.S. could not elicit a successful military conclusion to this conflict? When one American killed another American, usually a superior officer or an NCO, the term "fragging" was used. Although the term simply meant that a fragmentation grenade was used in the murder, it later became an all encompassing expression for such an action. From 1969 to 1973 at least 600 officers were murdered, and another 1400 died mysteriously. The most common motive for choosing a fragmentation grenade was to avoid identification and punishment by one's superiors or dishonor brought to one's unit. When a grenade was thrown in the heat of battle, soldiers claimed that it landed too close to the person they "accidentally" killed, that another member of the unit threw the grenade, or even that a VC soldier threw it. Unlike a bullet, an exploded grenade couldn't be traced to anyone, by ballistics or any other means. The grenade itself was destroyed in the explosion, and the remaining shrapnel wasn't distinctive enough to permit tracing to a specific grenade or soldier.

This phenomenon rarely makes the history books, but is virtually omnipresent in any realistic memoir of the Vietnam war. Fragging always involved the murder of a commanding officer that was identified as unpopular, harsh, inept or overzealous. As the war became more unpopular, soldiers became reluctant to go into harm's way and preferred leaders with a similar sense of self-preservation. If an officer was incompetent, fragging the officer was viewed as a method of self-preservation for the men serving under him. As in the paradigm Russell previously mentioned, fragging was viewed as an option to eliminate a commander that freely took on dangerous or suicidal missions, especially one seeking glory for himself. Sometimes warnings would be given beforehand to the unpopular officer by placing a grenade pin on his bed, with a fragging occurring if the offender's actions continuing as before. Murders were arranged if officers were wasting their men's lives needlessly or were giving dangerous orders and refusing to listen to reason or threats. Sometimes, fragging was the only way to get a new and safer commanding officer. Another interesting comment that might have affected the outcome of the war was brought up by Russell in the following manner: "We began receiving incoming NVA artillery rounds from across the valley in Laos. We were like sitting ducks up there and I remember being terribly afraid. Our brass would not allow us to return the fire for fear of escalating the war, or some lame excuse." The rules of engagement (ROE) during the war in Vietnam were one of the most controversial aspects of that conflict. ROE were intended to reduce the chance of friendly fire incidents and recognize international law regarding the conduct of war, particularly the need to protect civilians, but in Vietnam they became a political tool as well.

The assortment of ROE's were mind boggling. There were "free fire zones" where anything that moved could by considered hostile and fired upon by American soldiers. This was designed to protect indigenous South Vietnamese from being fired upon in their own villages by patrolling U.S. grunts on search and destroy missions. However, many villages in South Vietnam willingly provided safe haven to Viet Cong fighters or were forcibly occupied by marauding bands of guerrillas who used the villages for cover. Many more were devotedly anti-Communist. The problem was that American forces often had difficulty in distinguishing among any of these villagers. The fact that the guerrillas commonly dressed in black cotton pajama-style outfits, like those worn by most Vietnamese peasants, served only to heighten the confusion. The most frustrating ROE, with the exception of The April 30, 1970 Cambodian Incursion, was the barring of any American ground troops to pursue enemy forces over the 17th parallel separating North and South Vietnam as well as into the North Vietnamese sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia. The NVA could shoot at our forces on the Cambodian/South Vietnamese border (or Laotian/South Vietnamese border), and then when fleeing into supposedly "neutral" areas, the Americans could not follow and annihilate them. If anyone cares to study the US Korean War of 1950 to 1953, where China intervened on North Korean's behalf and nuclear confrontation nearly occurred, the reasons for ROE's will manifest themself. Nevertheless, this did not assuage Russell or his fellow Marines in their being denied the ability to follow the enemy and destroy them regardless of where they fled.

The true horror of Joel Russell's Vietnam experience occurred on "Fox Hill Ridge". With the aforementioned "Rules of Engagement", the NVA had the luxury of operating from "neutral" Laos and Cambodia free from attack. To defend this 800-mile border, the American and South Vietnamese Army established a string of border outposts intended to offset the NVA presence and allow an American counter-attack once these enemy troops entered the South. Hill 222 was one of those outposts. In May of 1968, American casualties were running as high as 500 men KIA per week. The huge majority of those dying were the small handful of troops defending these outposts. One outfit, "Fox Trot" was overrun on Hill 222 and Russell's "2/3" was ordered up this hill to retrieve any casualties as well as retake the now NVA occupied ridge. Russell's unit took the hill with small casualties. However, on the morning of May 28th, 1968, at 3:45 AM, the NVA charged up this hill in a "human wave" suicide charge", which defies description off the carnage Russell witnessed. The only thing that saved the 2/3 that day was air power, with "Puff" being called to the rescue. "Puff" was a U.S. Air Force C-47 military version of the DC-3 that had been modified by mounting three 7.62mm General Electric mini guns to fire through two rear window openings and the side cargo door, all on the left side of the aircraft. Its primary function was close air support for ground troops and could orbit Hill 222 for hours providing suppressing fire. The Douglas AC-47 Spooky, nicknamed "Puff, the Magic Dragon" covered an elliptical area approximately 52 yards in diameter, placing a round every 2.4 yards during a 3-second burst. The NVA melted away once "Puff" came on the scene, but not before 9 marines and over 250 enemy lost their lives. Russell's comments about that battle are historically priceless. Elucidating the carnage he witnessed, Russell wrote: "The smell of the smoke and the burned flesh was nauseating. The smell of gunfire flares and white phosphorous was enough to choke a horse let alone a man. Our planes dropped napalm, which was one of the most terrifying things that we ever used. I am thankful to the Lord our God that the enemy never had the planes and technology to use on us that we used on them. I would not have wanted to be in their place in this war."

There is so much packed into the middle of this book that it is impossible to detail the rich history that Russell leaves the reader with. Mistreatment of North Vietnamese prisoners of war, drug and liquor problems among troops, rat infestations at Khe Sanh and the disrespectful flippancy he was subjected to upon return as a war veteran are important issues. When Russell was in Vietnam, he kept to himself, not making friends. He justified this as follows:"I tried not to get too close to people because it was really hard to put someone you cared about in a body bag." His isolation continued upon his return, as after his tour was completed, his dour remarks speak volumes. Deplaning fresh from Vietnam on December 31, 1968, Russell remarked: "There was no band. There was no pretty girls, Nothing! It was like a graveyard! There was nobody there to welcome us back, after spending 13 months of hell trying to defend my country's honor. It hurt really badly! I still cry about that night!" Russell completes this book with an incomprehensible immersion into Christianity, the bible, talking in tongues, faith healing and Bipolar disorders. It is hard for the nonreligious to follow the last part of Russell's book, as one wonders if what Russell is writing was iatrogenically caused, or divinely inspired. It is a miracle that with the trauma Russell experienced and partook in, he still was able to be lucid enough to write this cogent memoir of one of the most trying times of the Vietnam War. This book is the fulfillment of a promise Russell made to God if he was spared from violent death. Russell, during the heat of battle, prayed: "God, if you can get me out of here, I'll live for you the rest of my life". Regardless of the failings, pitfalls, handicaps and shortcomings he has undergone, Joel Russell has undoubtedly fulfilled and exceeded his vow to his wife, his family, America and God! Joel Russell is a true soldier, patriot, family man, American and a blessed child of God!