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"Abstract: In Citizens United, the Supreme Court relaxed the ability of corporations to spend money on elections, rejecting a shareholder-protection rationale for restrictions on spending. Little research has focused on the relationship between corporate governance -- shareholder rights and power -- and corporate political activity. This paper explores that relationship in the S&P 500 to predict the effect of Citizens United on shareholder wealth. The paper finds that in the period 1998-2004 shareholder-friendly governance was consistently and strongly negatively related to observable political activity before and after controlling for established correlates of that activity, even in a firm fixed effects model. Political activity, in turn, is strongly negatively correlated with firm value. These findings -- together with the likelihood that unobservable political activity is even more harmful to shareholder interests -- imply that laws that replace the shareholder protections removed by Citizens United would be valuable to shareholders"--John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business web site.
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Corporate governance and corporate political activity: what effect will citizens united have on shareholder wealth
2010, Harvard Law School
electronic resource :
in English
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Title from PDF file as viewed on 12/16/2010.
Includes bibliographical references.
Also available in print.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
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