Asset class diversification and delegation of responsibilities between central banks and sovereign wealth funds

Asset class diversification and delegation of ...
Joshua Aizenman, Joshua Aizenm ...
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Last edited by MARC Bot
October 17, 2020 | History

Asset class diversification and delegation of responsibilities between central banks and sovereign wealth funds

"This paper presents a model comparing the degree of asset class diversification abroad by a central bank and a sovereign wealth fund. We show that if the central bank manages its foreign asset holdings in order to meet balance of payments needs, particularly in reducing the probability of sudden stops in foreign capital inflows, it will place a high weight on holding safer foreign assets. In contrast, if the sovereign wealth fund, acting on behalf of the Treasury, maximizes the expected utility of a representative domestic agent, it will opt for relatively greater holding of more risky foreign assets. We also show how the diversification differences between the strategies of the bank and SWF is affected by the government's delegation of responsibilities and by various parameters of the economy, such as the volatility of equity returns and the total amount of public foreign assets available for management"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.

Publish Date
Language
English

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Edition Availability
Cover of: Asset class diversification and delegation of responsibilities between central banks and sovereign wealth funds
Asset class diversification and delegation of responsibilities between central banks and sovereign wealth funds
2010, National Bureau of Economic Research
electronic resource / in English
Cover of: Asset class diversification and delegation of responsibilities between central banks and sovereign wealth funds
Asset class diversification and delegation of responsibilities between central banks and sovereign wealth funds
2010, National Bureau of Economic Research
electronic resource / in English

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Book Details


Edition Notes

Title from PDF file as viewed on 2/8/2011.

Includes bibliographical references.

Also available in print.

System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.

Mode of access: World Wide Web.

Published in
Cambridge, MA
Series
NBER working paper series -- working paper 16392, Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 16392.

Classifications

Library of Congress
HB1

The Physical Object

Format
[electronic resource] /

ID Numbers

Open Library
OL30655174M
LCCN
2011655610

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October 17, 2020 Created by MARC Bot Imported from Library of Congress MARC record