Do consumers choose the right credit contracts?

Do consumers choose the right credit contract ...
Sumit Agarwal, Sumit Agarwal
Not in Library

My Reading Lists:

Create a new list

Check-In

×Close
Add an optional check-in date. Check-in dates are used to track yearly reading goals.
Today


Buy this book

Last edited by MARC Bot
December 17, 2020 | History

Do consumers choose the right credit contracts?

"A number of studies have pointed to various mistakes that consumers might make in their consumption-saving and financial decisions. We utilize a unique market experiment conducted by a large U.S. bank to assess how systematic and costly such mistakes are in practice. The bank offered consumers a choice between two credit card contracts, one with an annual fee but a lower interest rate and one with no annual fee but a higher interest rate. To minimize their total interest costs net of the fee, consumers expecting to borrow a sufficiently large amount should choose the contract with the fee, and vice-versa. We find that on average consumers chose the contract that ex post minimized their net costs. A substantial fraction of consumers (about 40%) still chose the ex post sub-optimal contract, with some incurring hundreds of dollars of avoidable interest costs. Nonetheless, the probability of choosing the sub-optimal contract declines with the dollar magnitude of the potential error, and consumers with larger errors were more likely to subsequently switch to the optimal contract. Thus most of the errors appear not to have been very costly, with the exception that a small minority of consumers persists in holding substantially sub- optimal contracts without switching"--Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago web site.

Publish Date
Language
English

Buy this book

Edition Availability
Cover of: Do consumers choose the right credit contracts?
Do consumers choose the right credit contracts?
2006, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
electronic resource / in English

Add another edition?

Book Details


Edition Notes

Title from PDF file as viewed on 11/13/2006.

Includes bibliographical references.

Also available in print.

System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.

Mode of access: World Wide Web.

Published in
Chicago, Ill.]
Series
Working paper series -- WP-2006-11, Working paper series (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. Research Department : Online) -- WP-2006-11.

Classifications

Library of Congress
HG2401

The Physical Object

Format
[electronic resource] /

ID Numbers

Open Library
OL31760338M
LCCN
2006620846

Community Reviews (0)

Feedback?
No community reviews have been submitted for this work.

Lists

This work does not appear on any lists.

History

Download catalog record: RDF / JSON / OPDS | Wikipedia citation
December 17, 2020 Created by MARC Bot Imported from Library of Congress MARC record