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"This paper shows how unilateral liberalization in one country can increase the voting support for reciprocal reduction in trade barriers in a partner country. When trade policies are determined simultaneously in the two countries, we show the possibility of multiple political equilibria - countries may both be protectionist or trade freely with each other. Starting with trade protection in both countries, a unilateral reform in one country is thus shown to bring about a free trade equilibrium (a self-enforcing state) that is consistent with majority voting in both countries"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
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Subjects
Commercial policy, Free tradeShowing 2 featured editions. View all 2 editions?
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Reciprocated unilateralism in trade reforms with majority voting
2004, National Bureau of Economic Research
in English
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Reciprocated unilateralism in trade reforms with majority voting
2004, National Bureau of Economic Research
Electronic resource
in English
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Book Details
Edition Notes
Includes bibliographical references.
Title from PDF file as viewed on 1/6/2005.
Also available in print.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.
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- Created April 1, 2008
- 5 revisions
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December 13, 2020 | Edited by MARC Bot | import existing book |
July 31, 2012 | Edited by VacuumBot | Updated format '[electronic resource] /' to 'Electronic resource' |
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October 31, 2008 | Edited by ImportBot | add URIs from original MARC record |
April 1, 2008 | Created by an anonymous user | Imported from Scriblio MARC record |