When do firms hire lobbyists?
The organization of lobbying at the Federal Communications Commission
by João Manuel Pacheco de Figueiredo
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"This paper examines the explanatory power of transaction cost economics to explain vertical integration decisions for lobbying by firms. We examine 150 lobbying contacts at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) on the issue of payphone compensation for dial-around calls. When firms lobby on topics that are highly firm-specific and prone to sensitive-information leakage, they are more likely to use employees to lobby the FCC. However, when topics arise that are more general to the industry and do not include sensitive information, firms are more likely to use outside counsel to lobby the FCC"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
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When do firms hire lobbyists?: The organization of lobbying at the Federal Communications Commission
2004, National Bureau of Economic Research
Electronic resource
in English
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Book Details
Edition Notes
Includes bibliographical references.
Title from PDF file as viewed on 1/25/2005.
Also available in print.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.
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- Created April 1, 2008
- 5 revisions
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| December 13, 2020 | Edited by MARC Bot | import existing book |
| July 29, 2012 | Edited by VacuumBot | Updated format '[electronic resource]' to 'Electronic resource' |
| December 12, 2009 | Edited by WorkBot | link works |
| October 31, 2008 | Edited by ImportBot | add URIs from original MARC record |
| April 1, 2008 | Created by an anonymous user | Imported from Scriblio MARC record |