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"This paper analyzes the issues of immigration and outsourcing in a general-equilibrium model of international factor mobility. In our model, legal immigration is controlled through a quota, while outsourcing is determined both by the firms (in response to market conditions) and through policy-imposed barriers. A loosening of the immigration quota reduces outsourcing, enriches capitalists, leads to losses for native workers, and raises national income. If the nation targets an exogenously determined immigration level, the second-best outsourcing tax can be either positive or negative. If in addition to the immigration target there is a wage target (arising out of income distribution concerns), an outsourcing subsidy is required. The analysis is extended to consider illegal immigration and enforcement policy. A higher legal immigration quota will lead to more illegal immigration if skilled and unskilled labor are complements in production. If the two kinds of labor are complements (substitutes), national income increases (decreases) monotonically with the level of legal immigration"--Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis web site.
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Immigration and outsourcing: a general equilibrium analysis
2005, IZA
Electronic resource
in English
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2
Immigration and outsourcing: a general equilibrium analysis
2005, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Electronic resource
in English
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Book Details
Edition Notes
Includes bibliographical references.
Title from PDF file as viewed on 9/28/2005.
Also available in print.
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Mode of access: World Wide Web.
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"This paper analyzes the issues of immigration and outsourcing in a general-equilibrium model of international factor mobility. In our model, legal immigration is controlled through a quota, while outsourcing is determined both by the firms (in response to market conditions) and through policy-imposed barriers. A loosening of the immigration quota reduces outsourcing, enriches capitalists, leads to losses for native workers, and raises national income. If the nation targets an exogenously determined immigration level, the second-best outsourcing tax can be either positive or negative. If in addition to the immigration target there is a wage target (arising out of income distribution concerns), an outsourcing subsidy is required. The analysis is extended to consider illegal immigration and enforcement policy. A higher legal immigration quota will lead to more illegal immigration if skilled and unskilled labor are complements in production. If the two kinds of labor are complements (substitutes), national income increases (decreases) monotonically with the level of legal immigration"--Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit web site.
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December 13, 2020 | Edited by MARC Bot | import existing book |
July 29, 2012 | Edited by VacuumBot | Updated format '[electronic resource] :' to 'Electronic resource' |
December 12, 2009 | Edited by WorkBot | link works |
October 31, 2008 | Edited by ImportBot | add URIs from original MARC record |
April 1, 2008 | Created by an anonymous user | Imported from Scriblio MARC record |