Family altruism and incentives
by Roberta Gatti
In the presence of imperfect information and uncertainty, altruistic parents might use intergenerational transfers strategically to elicit effort from their children. As a result, gift and bequests are less reactive to the income realizations of the children than the standard altruistic model of the family predicts. Ricardian equivalence holds in this setup whenever the non-negativity constraint on bequests is not binding.
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Subjects
Altruism, Econometric models, Inheritance and successionShowing 1 featured edition. View all 1 editions?
| Edition | Availability |
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1
Family altruism and incentives
2000, World Bank, Development Research Group, Macroeconomics and Growth
Electronic resource
in English
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Book Details
Edition Notes
Also available in print.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 37-38).
Title from title screen as viewed on Sept. 30, 2002.
"December 2000"--Cover.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.
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- Created April 1, 2008
- 6 revisions
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| December 7, 2020 | Edited by MARC Bot | import existing book |
| August 4, 2012 | Edited by VacuumBot | Updated format '[electronic resource] /' to 'Electronic resource' |
| December 14, 2009 | Edited by WorkBot | link works |
| December 14, 2009 | Edited by WorkBot | link works |
| April 1, 2008 | Created by an anonymous user | Imported from Scriblio MARC record |