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This paper uses a series of experiments with commercial bank loan officers to test the effect of performance incentives on risk-assessment and lending decisions. We first show that, while high-powered incentives lead to greater screening effort and more profitable lending, their power is muted by both deferred compensation and the limited liability typically enjoyed by credit officers. Second, we present direct evidence that incentive contracts distort judgment and beliefs, even among trained professionals with many years of experience. Loans evaluated under more permissive incentive schemes are rated significantly less risky than the same loans evaluated under pay-for-performance.
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Incentivizing calculated risk-taking: evidence from an experiment with commercial bank loan officers
2012, Harvard Business School
in English
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"July 2012"-- Publisher's website.
Includes bibliographical references.
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- Created December 13, 2022
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December 13, 2022 | Created by MARC Bot | Imported from harvard_bibliographic_metadata record |