France's fall in 1940 was Europe's loss. Germany's rise and hegemony inflicted horrendous suffering and savagery. The transition from victor in 1918 to vanquished in 1940 has usually been seen in terms of a decline and fall, France's defeat the outcome of deep-seated political, social, and economic weaknesses.

But that view has been undermined by detailed studies of recent years. In this new account - the only up-to-date one-volume treatment - Adamthwaite offers a long-overdue reassessment of all the central issues, drawing on the secondary work in the field but relying also on his own findings in the archives. Nothing was inevitable about France's eclipse: the victory of 1918, he argues, could have been turned into a real predominance. Despite powerful constraints, leaders had room for manoeuvre.

Contingency and chanciness not inevitability characterized French policy.

The roles of prime ministers, presidents, foreign ministries, military chiefs are but one part of the story, as this book demonstrates; they operated in a context subject to the ebb and flow of different economic, political, strategic and cultural influences, all contributing to the shaping of policy. The rivalries, lapses, and absurdities inherent in most human conduct also find a place, usually comic in retrospect, often expressive of larger discontents or difficulties.

Adamthwaite has brought alive again issues long buried under the weight of orthodox opinion, showing us a France whose fate was less preordained than is customarily supposed. It is for that reason alone a more poignant story than usual.