Record ID | harvard_bibliographic_metadata/ab.bib.09.20150123.full.mrc:17242224:2542 |
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LEADER: 02542cam a22003018a 4500
001 009016867-4
005 20030922111452.0
008 020716s2003 enk b 001 0 eng
010 $a 2002074059
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040 $aDLC$cDLC$dDLC$dMH-L
043 $an-us---
050 00 $aKF5130$b.L68 2003
082 00 $a342.73/052$221
100 1 $aLovell, George I.
245 10 $aLegislative deferrals :$bstatutory ambiguity, judicial power, and American democracy /$cGeorge I. Lovell.
260 $aCambridge, UK ;$aNew York :$bCambridge University Press,$c2003.
300 $axxi, 290 p. ;$c24 cm.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 270-278) and index.
505 0 $aRethinking judicial policy making in a separation of powers system -- False victories: labor, Congress, and the courts, 1898-1935 -- "As harmless as an infant": the Erdman Act in Congress and the courts -- Killing with kindness: legislative ambiguity, judicial policy making, and the Clayton Act -- The Norris-LaGuardia Act, for once: learning what to learn from the past -- Legislative deferrals and judicial policy making in the administrative state: a brief look at the Wagner Act.
520 1 $a"Why do unelected federal judges have so much power to make policy in the United States? Why were federal judges able to thwart apparent legislative victories won by labor organizations in the Lochner era? Most scholars who have addressed such questions assume that the answer lies in the judiciary's constitutionally guaranteed independence and thus worry that insulated judges threaten democracy when they stray from baseline positions chosen by legislators. This book argues for a fundamental shift in the way scholars think about judicial policymaking. Instead of simply seeing judges as rivals to legislators, scholars need to notice that legislators also empower judges to make policy as a means of escaping accountability. The first book-length study of legislative deference to the courts, Legislative Deferrals offers a dramatic reinterpretation of the history of twentieth-century labor law and shows how attention to legislative deferrals can help scholars to address vexing questions about the consequences of judicial power in a democracy."--Jacket.
650 0 $aPolitical questions and judicial power$zUnited States.
650 0 $aJudge-made law$zUnited States.
650 0 $aLegislative power$zUnited States.
650 0 $aSeparation of powers$zUnited States.
988 $a20021127
906 $0DLC