Record ID | harvard_bibliographic_metadata/ab.bib.09.20150123.full.mrc:459246094:2091 |
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LEADER: 02091nam a2200265Ka 4500
001 009456775-1
005 20040920175354.0
008 040914s2004 maua b 000 0 eng d
035 0 $aocm56504978
040 $aHBS$cHBS
100 1 $aKhanna, Tarun.
245 14 $aThe evolution of concentrated ownership in India broad patterns and a history of the Indian software industry /$cTarun Khanna, Krishna G. Palepu.
260 $a[Boston] :$bDivision of Research, Harvard Business School,$cc2004.
300 $a52 p. :$bill. ;$c28 cm.
490 1 $aWorking paper / Division of Research, Harvard Business School ;$v05-001
500 $a"June 30, 2004"--Added t.p.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 $aAs in many countries (Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Italy, Sweden), concentrated ownership has been a ubiquitous feature of the Indian private sector over the past seven decades. Yet, unlike in most countries, the identity of the primary families responsible for the concentrated ownership changes dramatically over time. The resulting turnover is perhaps even more than turnover in leading U.S. firms over the same time period. It does not appear that concentrated ownership in India is entirely associated with the ills that the literature has recently ascribed to it in emerging markets. If the concentrated owners are not exclusively, or even primarily, engaged in rent-seeking and entry-deterring behavior, concentrated ownership may not be inimical to competition. Indeed, as a response to competition, we argue that at least some Indian families have consistently tried to leverage internal markets for capital and talent inherent in business group structures to launch new ventures in environments where external factor markets are deficient.
650 0 $aComputer software industry$zIndia.
650 0 $aCorporate governance$zIndia.
700 1 $aPalepu, Krishna G.,$d1954-
710 2 $aHarvard Business School.$bDivision of Research.
830 0 $aWorking paper (Harvard Business School. Division of Research) ;$v05-001.
988 $a20040920
906 $0MH