Record ID | harvard_bibliographic_metadata/ab.bib.09.20150123.full.mrc:517041442:2432 |
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LEADER: 02432cam a22003014a 45 0
001 009518481-3
003 OCoLC
005 20090707175505.0
008 030616s2004 enka b 001 0 eng
010 $a2003056382
015 $aGBA4-X2188
020 $a0195169344 (cloth : alk. paper)
035 0 $aocm52495036
040 $aDLC$cDLC$dUKM$dC#P
042 $apcc
050 00 $aBJ1473$b.N53 2004
082 00 $a170/.4$221
100 1 $aNichols, Shaun.
245 10 $aSentimental rules :$bon the natural foundations of moral judgment /$cShaun Nichols.
260 $aOxford ;$aNew York :$bOxford University Press,$c2004.
300 $ax, 226 p. :$bill. ;$c25 cm.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 199-217) and index.
505 0 $aNorms with Feeling: Toward a Psychological Account of Moral Judgment -- Sparks of Benevolence: The Varied Emotional Responses to Suffering in Others -- Is It Irrational to Be Amoral? How Psychopaths Threaten Moral Rationalism -- Philosophical Sentimentalism -- Sentiment, Reason, and Motivation -- A Fragment of the Genealogy of Norms -- Moral Evolution -- Commonsense Objectivism and the Persistence of Moral Judgment.
520 1 $a"Sentimental Rules is an ambitious and highly interdisciplinary work that proposes and defends a new theory about the nature and evolution of moral judgment. In it, philosopher Shaun Nichols develops the theory that emotions play a critical role in both the psychological and the cultural underpinnings of basic moral judgment. Nichols argues that our norms prohibiting the harming of others are fundamentally associated with our emotional responses to those harms, and that such "sentimental rules" enjoy an advantage in cultural evolution, which partly explains the success of certain moral norms. This has sweeping and exciting implications for philosophical ethics."
520 8 $a"Nichols builds on an explosion of recent intriguing experimental work in psychology on our capacity for moral judgment and shows how this empirical work has broad import for enduring philosophical problems. The result is an account that illuminates fundamental questions about the character of moral emotions and the role of sentiment and reason in how we make our moral judgments. This work should appeal widely across philosophy and the other disciplines that comprise cognitive science."--Jacket.
650 0 $aEmotivism.
988 $a20041214
906 $0DLC