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Record ID harvard_bibliographic_metadata/ab.bib.10.20150123.full.mrc:61863076:1954
Source harvard_bibliographic_metadata
Download Link /show-records/harvard_bibliographic_metadata/ab.bib.10.20150123.full.mrc:61863076:1954?format=raw

LEADER: 01954cam a22003134a 4500
001 010109249-0
005 20061003133347.0
008 051110s2006 enka b 001 0 eng
010 $a 2005032017
020 $a0415243394 (hbk.)
020 $a0203966600 (ebk.)
024 3 $c9780415243391 (hbk.)
024 3 $c9780203966600 (ebk.)
035 0 $aocm62324604
040 $aDLC$cDLC$dBAKER$dBWKUK
042 $apcc
050 00 $aB1499.C38$bB44 2006
082 00 $a122.092$222
100 1 $aBeebee, Helen.
245 10 $aHume on causation /$cHelen Beebee.
260 $aLondon ;$aNew York :$bRoutledge,$c2006.
300 $ax, 236 p. :$bill. ;$c24 cm.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 231-233) and index..
505 0 $aA priori reasoning and the genesis of knowledge -- Causal reasoning and the genesis of belief -- The idea of necessary connection -- The traditional interpretation -- Projectivism -- Sceptical realism.
520 $a"Hume on Causation is the first major work dedicated to Hume's views on causation in over fifteen years. It places Hume's interest in causation within the context of his theory of the mind and his theory of causal reasoning, arguing that Hume's conception of causation derives from his conception of the nature of the inference from causes to effects. Helen Beebee argues that Hume's interest in inductive reasoning is an interest in the psychological process involved in inferring effects from causes, and not in the epistemological 'problem of induction' as traditionally conceived. She also motivates and develops a projectivist interpretation of Hume's theory of causation, according to which our causal talk is an expression of our inferential habits, and argues that for Hume the projection of those habits affects not only how we conceive of the world, but also how we see it."--Jacket.
600 10 $aHume, David,$d1711-1776.
650 0 $aCausation.
988 $a20060920
906 $0DLC