MARC Record from harvard_bibliographic_metadata

LEADER: 02581cam a2200445 a 4500
001 011836222-4
005 20150113021352.0
008 060710s2006 ne a b 001 0 eng d
010 $a 2006278340
015 $aGBA600292$2bnb
016 7 $a013342203$2Uk
016 $aB0515596$2bccb
020 $a1402039964 (hard : alk. paper)
020 $z1402039829 (e-book)
020 $a9781402039966
024 3 $a9781402039824
035 0 $aocm62230024
040 $aOHX$cOHX$dUKM$dBAKER$dAZS$dNLGGC$dMUU$dDLC
042 $alccopycat
050 00 $aB105.A35$bS64 2006
082 00 $a128/.4$222
100 1 $aSneddon, Andrew.
245 10 $aAction and responsibility /$cby Andrew Sneddon.
246 18 $aActions and responsibility
260 $aDordrecht :$bSpringer,$cc2006.
300 $aix, 198 p. :$bill. ;$c25 cm.
440 0 $aLibrary of ethics and applied philosophy ;$vv. 18
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 181-185) and index.
505 0 $aTwo Questions -- Ascriptivism Resurrected: The Case for Ascriptivism -- Ascriptivism Defended: The Case Against Ascriptivism -- Responsibility and Causation I: Legal Responsibility -- Responsibility and Causation II: Moral Responsibility -- Foundationalism and the Production Question -- Foundationalism and the Status Question: Strong Productionism -- Nouveau Volitionism -- Weak Productionism -- Concluding Reflections on Ascriptivism and Action.
520 $aWhat makes an event count as an action? Typical answers appeal to the way in which the event was produced: e.g., perhaps an arm movement is an action when caused by mental states (in particular ways), but not when caused in other ways. Andrew Sneddon argues that this type of answer, which he calls "productionism", is methodologically and substantially mistaken. In particular, productionist answers to this question tend to be either individualistic or foundationalist, or both, without explicit defence. Instead, Sneddon offers an externalist, anti-foundationalist account of what makes an event count as an action, which he calls neo-ascriptivism, after the work of H.L.A. Hart. Specifically, Sneddon argues that our practices of attributing moral responsibility to each other are at least partly constitutive of events as actions.
650 0 $aAct (Philosophy)
650 0 $aResponsibility.
650 0 $aEvents (Philosophy)
650 0 $aPhilosophy (General).
650 0 $aEthics.
650 0 $aMetaphysics.
650 0 $aPhilosophy of mind.
650 0 $aSocial sciences$xPhilosophy.
988 $a20090223
906 $0OCLC