MARC Record from harvard_bibliographic_metadata

LEADER: 01988nam a2200241Ka 4500
001 012031788-5
005 20090709095136.0
008 090528s2009 maua b 000|0 eng d
035 0 $aocn542346606
100 1 $aIvashina, Victoria.
245 10 $aInstitutional stock trading on loan market information /$cVictoria Ivashina, Zheng Sun.
260 $a[Boston] :$bHarvard Business School,$cc2009.
300 $a[2]ℓ, 44 p. :$bill. ;$c28 cm.
490 1 $aWorking paper / Harvard Business School ;$v08-50
500 $a"First draft: February, 2008, this draft: August, 2007"--ℓ. [2].
500 $a"January 2008"--Publisher's website.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 $aOver the past decade, one of the most important developments in the corporate loan market has been the increasing participation of institutional investors in lending syndicates. As lenders, institutional investors routinely receive private information about borrowers. However, most of these investors also trade in public securities. This leads to a controversial question: do institutional investors use private information received in the loan market to trade in public securities? In this paper, we examine the stock trading of institutional investors that also hold loans in their portfolio. Specifically, we look at the abnormal returns on stock trades following loan renegotiations. By collecting SEC filings of loan amendments, we are able to identify institutional investors that had access to private information disclosed by the borrower during loan renegotiations. Our results indicate that institutional managers that participate in loan renegotiations consequently trade in stock of the same company and outperform other managers by approximately 8.8% in annualized terms in the month following loan renegotiation.
700 1 $aSun, Zheng.
710 2 $aHarvard Business School.
830 0 $aWorking paper (Harvard Business School) ;$v08-50.
988 $a20090709
906 $0MH