MARC Record from harvard_bibliographic_metadata

LEADER: 01886nam a2200253Ka 4500
001 012032741-4
005 20090710131748.0
008 081124m20082009maua b 000|0 eng d
035 0 $aocn428434325
100 0 $aLakshmi Iyer.
245 10 $aTraveling agents :$bpolitical change and bureaucratic turnover in India /$cLakshmi Iyer, Anandi Mani.
250 $a[Rev.]
260 $a[Boston :$bHarvard Business School],$cc2008, 2009.
300 $a36, [12] p. :$bill. ;$c28 cm.
490 1 $aWorking paper / Harvard Business School ;$v09-006
500 $a"March 2009"--added t.p.
500 $a"July 2008, revised April 2009"--Publisher's web site.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 $aWe develop a framework to examine how politicians with short-term electoral pressures control bureaucrats with long-term career concerns. Empirical analysis using a unique data set on the career histories of Indian bureaucrats supports the key predictions of our framework. We find that politicians use frequent reassignments (transfers) across posts of varying importance as a means of control. High-skilled bureaucrats face less frequent transfers and a lower variability in the importance of their posts. There are alternative routes to career success: officers of higher initial ability are more likely to invest in developing expertise, but officers who belong to the same caste as the politician are also able to obtain important posts. Bureaucrats are less likely to be transferred if politicians have alternative means of control through subordinate politicians. Districts with higher rates of politically induced bureaucrat transfers are somewhat less successful in poverty reduction over the long run.
700 1 $aMani, Anandi.
710 2 $aHarvard Business School.
830 0 $aWorking paper (Harvard Business School) ;$v09-006.
988 $a20090710
906 $0MH