MARC Record from harvard_bibliographic_metadata

LEADER: 03082nam a22002894a 4500
001 012644459-5
005 20110103132103.0
008 100506s2010 enk b 001 0 eng
010 $a 2010019534
020 $a9780521766647 (hardback)
035 0 $aocn614397226
035 0 $aocn695537931
040 $aDLC$cDLC$dMH-L
050 00 $aKZ6374$b.R89 2010
082 00 $a341.6/2$222
100 1 $aRuys, Tom.
245 10 $aArmed attack and Article 51 of the UN Charter :$bcustomary law and practice /$cTom Ruys.
260 $aCambridge ;$aNew York :$bCambridge University Press,$c2010.
300 $axxx, 585 p. ;$c24 cm.
490 0 $aCambridge studies in international and comparative law
505 0 $aThe methodological debate and the quest for custom -- 'Armed attack' and other conditions of self-defence -- The 'armed attack' requirement ratione materiae -- The 'armed attack' requirement ratione temporis -- The 'armed attack' requirement ratione personae -- What future for the 'armed attack' criterion?
520 $a"This book examines to what extent the right of self-defence, as laid down in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, permits States to launch military operations against other States. In particular, it focuses on the occurrence of an 'armed attack' - the crucial trigger for the activation of this right. In light of the developments since 9/11, the author analyses relevant physical and verbal customary practice, ranging from the 1974 Definition of Aggression to recent incidents such as the 2001 US intervention in Afghanistan and the 2006 Israeli intervention in Lebanon. The notion of 'armed attack' is examined from a threefold perspective. What acts can be regarded as an 'armed attack'? When can an 'armed attack' be considered to take place? And from whom must an 'armed attack' emanate? By way of conclusion, the different findings are brought together in a draft 'Definition of Armed Attack'"--$cProvided by publisher.
520 $a"On June 27, 1986, the International Court of Justice pronounced its much-anticipated judgment in the Nicaragua case. For the first time in its history, it gave a direct and elaborate ruling on issues pertaining to the international law on the use of force (Ius ad Bellum), including on the conditions for the exercise of States' right of self-defence. If the Court's approach merits praise for unequivocally affirming that disputes involving the recourse to force are inherently justiciable, it is somewhat puzzling what led the Hague Judges to conclude that "[t]here appears now to be general agreement on the nature of the acts which can be treated as constituting armed attacks", triggering the right of self-defence. Whether it was naivety, overconfidence or bluff on their part is open to speculation, yet one need not possess the combined legal skills of Grotius and Vattel to understand that it did not completely reflect normative reality"--$cProvided by publisher.
650 0 $aSelf-defense (International law)
650 0 $aAggression (International law)
988 $a20101221
906 $0DLC