MARC Record from harvard_bibliographic_metadata

LEADER: 05013cam a2200349 a 4500
001 012728599-7
005 20110502232144.0
008 100621s2010 maua b 001 0 eng
010 $a 2010026311
020 $a9780262015134 (hardcover : alk. paper)
020 $a0262015137 (hardcover : alk. paper)
035 0 $aocn645247239
040 $aDLC$cDLC$dYDX$dYDXCP$dMYG$dCDX$dBWX
050 00 $aHB846.8$b.B354 2010
082 00 $a302/.13$222
100 1 $aBalinski, M. L.
245 10 $aMajority judgment :$bmeasuring, ranking, and electing /$cMichel Balinski and Rida Laraki.
260 $aCambridge, Mass. :$bMIT Press,$cc2010.
300 $axv, 414 p. ;$bill. ;$c24 cm.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. [395]-403) and indexes.
505 00 $gMachine generated contents note:$g1.$tMajority Judgment --$g1.1.$tInputs and Outputs --$g1.2.$tMessages of a Common Language --$g1.3.$tMajority-Grade --$g1.4.$tMajority-Ranking --$g1.5.$tMajority-Value --$g1.6.$tMajority-Gauge --$g1.7.$tNomenclature --$g1.8.$tThe Thesis --$g2.$tVoting in Practice --$g2.1.$tUnited States of America --$g2.2.$tZurich, Switzerland --$g2.3.$tMexico --$g2.4.$tUnited Kingdom --$g2.5.$tAustralia --$g2.6.$tFrance --$g2.7.$tThe Lessons --$g3.$tTraditional Social Choice --$g3.1.$tTraditional Methods and Concepts --$g3.2.$tIIA and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem --$g3.3.$tRestricting the Domain --$g4.$tElecting versus Ranking in the Traditional Model --$g4.1.$tCondorcet's Method of Ranking --$g4.2.$tBorda's and Sum-Scoring Methods --$g4.3.$tObjections to Condorcet-Consistency --$g4.4.$tBorda-Winners and Condorcet-Rankings --$g4.5.$tIncompatibility of Electing and Ranking --$g4.6.$tPreferences over Rank-Orders.
505 00 $g5.$tStrategy in the Traditional Model --$g5.1.$tGibbard-Satterthwaite's Impossibility Theorem --$g5.2.$tGalton's Middlemost --$g5.3.$tMajority Judgment Methods --$g5.4.$tThe Majority Judgment for the Traditional Model --$g6.$tFallacies of the Traditional Model in Voting --$g6.1.$tUnrealistic Inputs --$g6.2.$tStatistical Left-Right Spectra --$g6.3.$tBorda's and Condorcet's Bias for the Center --$g6.4.$tConclusion --$g7.$tJudging in Practice --$g7.1.$tStudents --$g7.2.$tEmployees --$g7.3.$tMusicians --$g7.4.$tSkaters and Gymnasts --$g7.5.$tDivers --$g7.6.$tCountries --$g7.7.$tWines --$g7.8.$tThe Paris Wine Tasting of 1976 --$g7.9.$tConclusion --$g8.$tCommon Language --$g8.1.$tExamples of Common Languages --$g8.2.$tMeasurement Theory --$g8.3.$tCommon Languages of Grading --$g8.4.$tOn the Optimal Number of Grades --$g8.5.$tInterval Measure Grades --$g8.6.$tThe Lesson --$g9.$tNew Model --$g9.1.$tInputs --$g9.2.$tSocial Grading Functions --$g9.3.$tSocial Ranking Functions --$g9.4.$tThe Role of Judges' Utilities.
505 00 $g10.$tStrategy in Grading --$g10.1.$tStrategy-Proofness in Grading --$g10.2.$tOrder Functions --$g10.3.$tMinimizing Manipulation --$g10.4.$tImplications --$g11.$tMeaningfulness --$g11.1.$tReinforcement and Conformity --$g11.2.$tLanguage-Consistency --$g11.3.$tOrder-Consistency --$g11.4.$tThe Meaning of Arrow's Theorem --$g12.$tMajority-Grade --$g12.1.$tMiddlemost Aggregation Function --$g12.2.$tMajority Decision --$g12.3.$tMinimizing Cheating --$g12.4.$tMaximizing Social Welfare --$g12.5.$tCrankiness --$g12.6.$tMajority-Grade --$g12.7.$tImplications --$g13.$tMajority-Ranking --$g13.1.$tStrategy-Proofness in Ranking --$g13.2.$tMajority-Value --$g13.3.$tCharacterization --$g13.4.$tJuries of Different Sizes --$g14.$tLarge Electorates --$g14.1.$tMajority-Gauge --$g14.2.$tAbbreviated Majority-Value --$g14.3.$tOther Rules --$g15.$tCommon Language: Voting --$g15.1.$tThe 2007 Orsay Experiment: Validation --$g15.2.$tCommon Use of Grades: Raw Data --$g15.3.$tMeasuring Homogeneity of Voters' Grades --$g15.4.$tConclusion.
505 00 $g16.$tObjections to Majority Judgment --$g16.1.$t"Majority" and "Average" Objections --$g16.2.$tNo-Show Objections --$g16.3.$tConclusion --$g17.$tPoint-Summing Methods --$g17.1.$tPoint-Summing Methods: Theory --$g17.2.$tPoint-Summing Methods: Practice --$g17.3.$tConclusion --$g18.$tApproval Voting --$g18.1.$tTraditional Arguments --$g18.2.$tThe Game of Approval Voting --$g18.3.$tApproval Judgment --$g18.4.$tPractice --$g19.$tComparisons of Voting Methods --$g19.1.$tBias for the Center --$g19.2.$tManipulability --$g19.3.$tConclusion --$g20.$tThe Game of Voting --$g20.1.$tEquilibria --$g20.2.$tHonest Equilibria --$g20.3.$tBest Response Equilibria --$g20.4.$tBest Response Dynamics --$g20.5.$tStrategic Majority Judgment Winner --$g20.6.$tCondorcet-Judgment-Winner --$g20.7.$tConclusion --$g21.$tMulticriteria Ranking --$g21.1.$tAggregating Criteria --$g21.2.$tCommon Language: Wine Competitions --$g21.3.$tMulticriteria Majority Judgment --$g22.$tA Summing Up.
650 0 $aSocial choice.
650 0 $aVoting.
650 0 $aRanking and selection (Statistics)
700 1 $aLaraki, Rida.
776 1 $cElectronic resource $z 9780262296335
899 $a415_565366
988 $a20110503
906 $0DLC