MARC Record from harvard_bibliographic_metadata

LEADER: 01980namaa2200265Ka 4500
001 013354552-0
005 20120918122721.0
008 120918s2012 maua b 000 0 eng d
035 0 $aocn810159785
040 $aHBS$cHBS
100 1 $aGino, Francesca.
245 10 $aLicense to cheat :$bvoluntary regulation and ethical behavior /$cFrancesca Gino, Erin L. Krupka, Roberto A. Weber.
260 $a[Boston] :$bHarvard Business School,$cc2012.
300 $a33 p. :$bill. ;$c28 cm.
490 1 $aWorking paper / Harvard Business School ;$v13-029
500 $a"September 2012" -- Publisher's website.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 $aWhile monitoring and regulation can be used to combat socially costly unethical conduct, their intended targets are often able to avoid regulation or hide their behavior. This surrenders at least part of the effectiveness of regulatory policies to firms' and individuals' decisions to voluntarily submit to regulation. We study individuals' decisions to avoid monitoring or regulation and thus enhance their ability to engage in unethical conduct. We conduct a laboratory experiment in which participants engage in a competitive task and can decide between having the opportunity to misreport their performance or having their performance verified by an external monitor. To study the effect of social factors on the willingness to be subject to monitoring, we vary whether participants make this decision simultaneously with others or sequentially as well as whether the decision is private or public. Our results show that the opportunity to avoid being submitted to regulation produces more unethical conduct than situations in which regulation is either exogenously imposed or entirely absent.
700 1 $aKrupka, Erin L.
700 1 $aWeber, Roberto A.
710 2 $aHarvard Business School.
830 0 $aWorking paper (Harvard Business School) ;$v13-029.
988 $a20120918
049 $aHBSM
906 $0MH