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Record ID harvard_bibliographic_metadata/ab.bib.13.20150123.full.mrc:635614603:2576
Source harvard_bibliographic_metadata
Download Link /show-records/harvard_bibliographic_metadata/ab.bib.13.20150123.full.mrc:635614603:2576?format=raw

LEADER: 02576cam a2200397 a 4500
001 013599912-X
005 20131108112823.0
008 120521s2013 mau b 001 0 eng
010 $a 2012016253
020 $a9780262018548 (hardcover : alk. paper)
020 $a0262018543 (hardcover : alk. paper)
024 8 $a40021781894
035 0 $aocn794555730
040 $aDLC$beng$cDLC$dYDXCP$dBTCTA$dBWX$dQGK$dCDX$dIBS$dOCLCO$dBDX$dYUS
042 $apcc
050 00 $aBF311$b.H89 2013
082 00 $a128/.2$223
100 1 $aHutto, Daniel D.
245 10 $aRadicalizing enactivism :$bbasic minds without content /$cDaniel D. Hutto and Erik Myin.
260 $aCambridge, Mass. :$bMIT Press,$cc2013.
300 $axxiv, 206 p. ;$c22 cm.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. [189]-198) and index.
505 0 $aEnactivism : the radical line -- Enactivisms less radical -- The reach of REC -- The hard problem of content -- CIC's retreat -- CIC's last stand -- Extensive minds -- Regaining consciousness.
520 $a"Most of what humans do and experience is best understood in terms of dynamically unfolding interactions with the environment. Many philosophers and cognitive scientists now acknowledge the critical importance of situated, environment-involving embodied engagements as a means of understanding basic minds -- including basic forms of human mentality. Yet many of these same theorists hold fast to the view that basic minds are necessarily or essentially contentful -- that they represent conditions the world might be in. In this book, Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin promote the cause of a radically enactive, embodied approach to cognition that holds that some kinds of minds -- basic minds -- are neither best explained by processes involving the manipulation of contents nor inherently contentful. Hutto and Myin oppose the widely endorsed thesis that cognition always and everywhere involves content. They defend the counter-thesis that there can be intentionality and phenomenal experience without content, and demonstrate the advantages of their approach for thinking about scaffolded minds and consciousness." -- Publisher's description.
650 0 $aCognition$xPhilosophy.
650 0 $aPhilosophy and cognitive science.
650 0 $aPhilosophy of mind.
650 0 $aCognitive science.
650 0 $aContent (Psychology)
700 1 $aMyin, Erik.
776 1 $cElectronic resource$z9780262312165
730 0 $aProject Muse UPCC books$5net
899 $a415_565692
988 $a20130122
049 $aHLSS
906 $0DLC