Record ID | harvard_bibliographic_metadata/ab.bib.13.20150123.full.mrc:752944781:1566 |
Source | harvard_bibliographic_metadata |
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LEADER: 01566cam a2200325Ia 4500
001 013690276-6
005 20130524103828.0
008 121005s2013 enk b 001 0 eng d
015 $aGBB2A1668$2bnb
016 7 $a016185962$2Uk
020 $a9780199696680 (hbk.)
020 $a0199696683 (hbk.)
035 0 $aocn812686208
040 $aUKMGB$beng$cUKMGB$dOCLCO$dYDXCP$dCDX$dYNK$dGHS$dSTF$dNYP$dBWX
050 4 $aBJ47$b.E93 2013
082 04 $a205$223
100 1 $aEvans, C. Stephen.
245 10 $aGod and moral obligation /$cC. Stephen Evans.
246 18 $aGod & moral obligation
260 $aOxford :$bOxford University Press,$c2013.
300 $avii, 199 ;$c22 cm.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
505 0 $aGod and moral obligations -- What is a divine command theory of moral obligation? -- The relation of divine command theory to natural law and virtue ethics -- Objections to divine command theory -- Alternatives to a divine command theory -- Conclusions: The inescapability of moral obligations.
520 8 $aC. Stephen Evans defends the claim that moral obligations are best understood as divine commands or requirements; hence an important part of morality depends on God. God's requirements are communicated in a variety of ways, including conscience, and that natural law ethics and virtue ethics provide complementary perspectives to this view.
650 0 $aDivine commands (Ethics)
650 0 $aReligious ethics.
650 0 $aReligion and ethics.
988 $a20130521
049 $aBHAA
906 $0OCLC