MARC Record from harvard_bibliographic_metadata

LEADER: 02783cam a2200397 a 4500
001 013791825-9
005 20131212225335.0
008 121012s2013 mdua b 001 0 eng
010 $a 2012038672
015 $aGBB303236$2bnb
016 7 $a016251756$2Uk
020 $a9780739178157 (hbk. : alk. paper)
020 $a0739178156 (hbk. : alk. paper)
020 $a9780739178164 (ebk.)
020 $a0739178164 (ebk.)
035 $a(PromptCat)99955304908
035 0 $aocn809411793
040 $aDLC$beng$cDLC$dYDX$dYDXCP$dBTCTA$dOCLCO$dCDX$dBWX$dUKMGB$dCGU$dCOO$dYLS$dPUL$dOCLCF
042 $apcc
043 $an-us---
050 00 $aKF4552$b.W57 2013
082 00 $a342.73001$223
100 1 $aWilson, Sean,$d1967-
245 14 $aThe flexible constitution /$cSean Wilson.
260 $aLanham, Md. :$bLexington Books,$cc2013.
300 $axxv, 209 p. :$bill. ;$c24 cm.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
505 0 $aWittgenstein, law and originalism -- Obeying flexible commands -- Is there a fixed meaning? -- Public meaning v. meaning as use -- The flexible constitution -- Structuralism and polysemy -- Law as connoisseur judgment -- The philosophy of Framers' intent -- Why Framers' intent is flawed -- The new originalism -- The Constitution as old society -- Cultural construction -- What originalism really is -- Appendix. The philosophical investigation.
520 $a"This is an ambitious work on constitutional theory. Influenced by the views of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Sean Wilson tackles the problem of how a judge can obey a document written in ordinary, flexible language. He argues that whether something is 'constitutional' is not an historical fact, but is an artisan judgment. Criteria are set forth showing why some judgments represent superior connoisseurship and why others do not. Along the way, Wilson offers a potent critique of originalism. He not only explains this belief system, but shows why it is inherently incompatible with the American legal system. His conclusion is that originalism can only be understood as a legal ideology, not a meaningful contribution to philosophy of law. The ways of thinking about constitutional interpretation provided in the book end up challenging the scholarship of Ronald Dworkin and numerous law professors. And the findings also challenge the way that professors of politics often think about whether a judge has 'followed law'"--Provided by publisher.
650 0 $aConstitutional law$zUnited States$xPhilosophy.
650 0 $aOrigin (Philosophy)
650 7 $aConstitutional law$xPhilosophy.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst00875821
650 7 $aOrigin (Philosophy)$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst01048180
651 7 $aUnited States.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst01204155
988 $a20131002
906 $0DLC