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LEADER: 03309nam a22005055a 4500
001 014277911-3
005 20150113020935.0
008 100301s2006 ne | s ||0| 0|eng d
020 $a9781402038389
020 $a9781402038389
020 $a9781402038372
024 7 $a10.1007/978-1-4020-3838-9$2doi
035 $a(Springer)9781402038389
040 $aSpringer
050 4 $aB67
072 7 $aPDA$2bicssc
072 7 $aSCI075000$2bisacsh
082 04 $a501$223
100 1 $aDilworth, Craig.$eauthor.
245 14 $aThe Metaphysics of Science-1 :$bAn Account of Modern Science in Terms of Principles, Laws and Theories /$cby Craig Dilworth.
264 1 $aDordrecht :$bSpringer Netherlands,$c2006.
300 $aXVI, 333 p.$bonline resource.
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $acomputer$bc$2rdamedia
338 $aonline resource$bcr$2rdacarrier
347 $atext file$bPDF$2rda
490 1 $aBoston Studies in The Philosophy of Science,$x0068-0346 ;$v173
505 0 $aEmpiricism Vs. Realism – The Perennial Debate In The Philosophy Of Science -- Fundamental And Refined Principles: The Core Of Modern Science -- Empirical Laws: The Supervention Of Experience -- Scientific Theories: Closing The Circle -- The Principle-Theory-Law Model Of Scientific Explanation -- The Social Sciences: A Consideration Of Economics -- Natural Kinds -- Probability And Confirmation -- Empiricism Vs. Realism Revisited -- Modern Science And The Future.
520 $aThe roots of this work lie in my earlier book, Scientific Progress, which first appeared in 1981. One of its topics, the distinction - tween scientific laws and theories, is there treated with reference to the same distinction as drawn by N. R. Campbell in his Physics: The Elements. Shortly after completing Scientific Progress, I read Rom Harré’s The Principles of Scientific Thinking, in which the concept of theory is even more clearly delineated than in Campbell, being directly connected to the notion of a model – as it was in my book. In subsequent considerations regarding science, Harré’s work thus - came my main source of inspiration with regard to theories, while Campbell’s remained my main source with respect to empirical laws. Around the same time I also read William Whewell’s Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences. In this work, Whewell depicts principles as playing a central role in the formation of science, and conceives of them in much the same way as Kant conceives of fundamental synthetic a priori judgements. The idea that science should have principles as a basic element immediately made sense to me, and from that time I have thought of science in terms of laws, theories and principles.
650 0 $aPhilosophy (General).
650 0 $aGenetic epistemology.
650 0 $aMetaphysics.
650 0 $aBiology$xPhilosophy.
650 0 $aScience$xPhilosophy.
650 0 $aSocial sciences$xPhilosophy.
650 14 $aPhilosophy.
650 24 $aPhilosophy of Science.
650 24 $aPhilosophy of the Social Sciences.
650 24 $aPhilosophy of Biology.
650 24 $aMetaphysics.
650 24 $aEpistemology.
776 08 $iPrinted edition:$z9781402038372
830 0 $aBoston Studies in The Philosophy of Science,$x0068-0346 ;$v173
988 $a20150113
906 $0VEN