MARC record from Internet Archive

LEADER: 04315cam 22007697i 4500
001 ocn894201801
003 OCoLC
005 20220812043858.0
008 140827t20152015enka b 001 0 eng d
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015 $aGBB528119$2bnb
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020 $a9780198735779$q(hardback)
020 $a0198735774$q(hardback)
020 $a9780198769316$q(paperback)
020 $a0198769318$q(paperback)
035 $a(OCoLC)894201801
042 $alccopycat
050 00 $aB105.A35$bH96 2015
082 04 $a128/.4$223
100 1 $aHyman, John,$eauthor.
245 10 $aAction, knowledge, and will /$cJohn Hyman.
250 $aFirst edition.
264 1 $aOxford, United Kingdom ;$aNew York, NY :$bOxford University Press,$c2015.
264 4 $c©2015
300 $axi, 255 pages :$billustrations ;$c24 cm
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $aunmediated$bn$2rdamedia
338 $avolume$bnc$2rdacarrier
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 236-246) and index.
505 0 $aAgency and the will -- Action and integration -- Acts and events -- Voluntariness and choice -- Desire and intention -- Reason and knowledge -- Knowledge as an ability -- The road to Larissa -- Appendix: The modern theory of the will.
520 $aWhat is the difference between the movements in our bodies we cause personally ourselves, such as the movements of our legs or our lips when we walk or speak, and the movements we do not cause personally, such as the contraction of the heart? Is an act that is done under duress done voluntarily, out of choice? Should duress exculpate a defendant completely, or should it merely mitigate the criminality of an act? When we explain an intentional act by stating our reasons for doing it, do we explain it causally or teleologically, or both? Should we care whether our choices are guided by knowledge or mere true belief? In this book, John Hyman explores these and other central problems in the philosophy of action and the theory of knowledge, and connects these areas of enquiry in a new way. The main premise of the book is that human action has four irreducibly different dimensions, each with its own family of concepts: - a physical dimension, in which the principal concepts are those of agent, power, and causation; a psychological dimension, with the concepts of desire, aim, and intention; an ethical dimension, with the concepts of voluntariness and choice; an intellectual dimension, with the concepts of reason, knowledge, and belief. Studying each of these dimensions of human action separately yields a string of original results, culminating in a new analysis of the relationship between knowledge and rational behaviour, which provides the foundation for a new theory of knowledge itself.
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650 0 $aAgent (Philosophy)
650 0 $aKnowledge, Theory of.
650 0 $aWill.
650 2 $aVolition
650 6 $aAction (Philosophie)
650 6 $aThéorie de la connaissance.
650 6 $aVolonté.
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948 $hNO HOLDINGS IN IME - 179 OTHER HOLDINGS