| Record ID | ia:deterrenceduring0000acto |
| Source | Internet Archive |
| Download MARC XML | https://archive.org/download/deterrenceduring0000acto/deterrenceduring0000acto_marc.xml |
| Download MARC binary | https://www.archive.org/download/deterrenceduring0000acto/deterrenceduring0000acto_meta.mrc |
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008 110329s2011 enka b 000 0 eng c
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050 4 $aJZ5595$b.A38 2011
055 4 $aU162$bI58 no.417
082 04 $aA327.174
100 1 $aActon, James M.,$eauthor.
245 10 $aDeterrence during disarmament :$bdeep nuclear reductions and international security /$cJames M. Acton.
246 3 $aDeep nuclear reductions and international security
264 1 $aAbingdon, Oxon :$bRoutledge, for the International Institute for Strategic Studies,$c2011.
300 $a128 pages :$billustrations ;$c24 cm.
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $aunmediated$bn$2rdamedia
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490 1 $aAdelphi,$x0567-932X ;$v417
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 109-126).
505 0 $aIntroduction --- Central deterrence --- Extended deterrence --- Crisis stability --- Rearmament stability --- Nuclear multipolarity --- Conclusions --- Appendix. Where are we now?
520 $aThere is a broad sense in both Russia and the United States that deep nuclear reductions--a goal endorsed by both governments--would constitute a risky step into the unknown and could undermine international security. However, until now, the reasons behind these concerns--and whether they are justified--have not been properly explored. Based on a series of interviews with opinion formers in both Russia and the United States, this Adelphi maps out these concerns as they relate to the effectiveness of deterrence (including extended deterrence), the possible incentives to use nuclear weapons first in a crisis, the potential for rearmament and nuclear multipolarity. Contrary to popular belief, there is evidence against which these fears can be assessed. The practical experience of deterrence at low numbers that was acquired by the Soviet Union and the United States early in the Cold War, as well as by other nuclear-armed states, is highly relevant. -- From https://books.google.com (Sep. 7, 2018).
650 0 $aSecurity, International.
650 0 $aNuclear nonproliferation.
650 0 $aUnilateral nuclear disarmament.
650 0 $aDeterrence (Strategy)
651 7 $aRussie.$2eclas
650 7 $aDeterrence (Strategy)$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst00891658
650 7 $aNuclear nonproliferation.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst01040376
650 7 $aSecurity, International.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst01110895
650 7 $aUnilateral nuclear disarmament.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst01161369
650 7 $aKernwaffe.$2idszbz
650 7 $aAbrüstung.$2idszbz
650 7 $aSicherheitspolitik.$2idszbz
650 7 $aKärnvapenfrågan.$2sao
650 7 $aNedrustning.$2sao
650 7 $aAvskräckningspolitik.$2sao
650 7 $anuclear nonproliferation.$2sipri
650 7 $anuclear disarmament.$2sipri
650 7 $anuclear weapons$xdeterrence.$2sipri
710 2 $aInternational Institute for Strategic Studies.
830 0 $aAdelphi (Series) (International Institute for Strategic Studies) ;$v417.
856 41 $uhttp://www.tandfonline.com/toc/tadl20/50/417#.UbDA51TD-Uk$xTaylor and Francis
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