| Record ID | ia:economiceffectso0000pers |
| Source | Internet Archive |
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LEADER: 02546pam a22003374a 4500
001 4138203
005 20221027043542.0
008 030310t20032003maua b 001 0 eng
010 $a 2003046343
020 $a0262162199 (hc. : alk. paper)
035 $a(OCoLC)ocm51861991
035 $a(NNC)4138203
035 $a4138203
040 $aDLC$cDLC$dYDX$dOrLoB-B
042 $apcc
050 00 $aK3165$b.P474 2003
082 00 $a338.9$221
100 1 $aPersson, Torsten.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n81148181
245 14 $aThe economic effects of constitutions /$cTorsten Persson and Guido Tabellini.
260 $aCambridge, Mass. :$bMIT Press,$c[2003], ©2003.
300 $axiii, 306 pages :$billustrations ;$c24 cm.
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $aunmediated$bn$2rdamedia
490 1 $aMunich lectures in economics
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. [287]-295) and indexes.
505 00 $g1.$tIntroduction and Overview --$g2.$tWhat Does Theory Say? --$g3.$tPolicy Measures and Their Determinants --$g4.$tElectoral Rules and Forms of Government --$g5.$tCross-Sectional Inference: Pitfalls and Methods --$g6.$tFiscal Policy: Variation across Countries --$g7.$tPolitical Rents and Productivity: Variation across Countries --$g8.$tFiscal Policy: Variation across Time --$g9.$tWhat Have We Learned?
520 1 $a"The authors of The Economic Effects of Constitutions use econometric tools to study what they call the "missing link" between constitutional systems and economic policy. Taking recent theoretical work as a point of departure, they ask which theoretical findings are supported and which are contradicted by the facts. The results are based on comparisons of political institutions across countries or time, in a large sample of contemporary democracies. They find that presidential/parliamentary and majoritarian/proportional dichotomies influence several economic variables: presidential regimes induce smaller public sectors, and proportional elections lead to greater and less-targeted government spending and larger budget deficits. Moreover, the details of the electoral system (such as district magnitude and ballot structure) influence corruption and structural policies toward economic growth."--BOOK JACKET.
650 0 $aConstitutional law$xEconomic aspects.
700 1 $aTabellini, Guido Enrico,$d1956-$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n88633817
830 0 $aMunich lectures in economics.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n95118583
852 00 $bleh$hK3165$i.P474 2003