Record ID | ia:economicvotehowp0000duch |
Source | Internet Archive |
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001 ocn227092780
003 OCoLC
005 20211016041113.0
008 080506s2008 enka ob 001 0 eng d
006 m o d
007 cr cnu---unuuu
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072 7 $aPOL$x016000$2bisacsh
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082 04 $a324.9$222
100 1 $aDuch, Raymond M.,$d1953-
245 14 $aThe economic vote :$bhow political and economic institutions condition election results /$cRaymond M. Duch, Randolph T. Stevenson.
260 $aCambridge, UK ;$aNew York :$bCambridge University Press,$c2008.
300 $a1 online resource (xiii, 399 pages) :$billustrations
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $acomputer$bc$2rdamedia
338 $aonline resource$bcr$2rdacarrier
490 1 $aPolitical economy of institutions and decisions
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 373-390) and index.
505 0 $aDefining and measuring the economic vote -- Patterns of retrospective economic voting in western democracies -- Estimation, measurement and specification -- Competency signals and rational retrospective economic voting -- What do voters know about economic variation and its sources? -- Political control of the economy -- Responsibility, contention, and the economic vote -- The distribution of responsibility and economic vote -- The pattern of contention and the economic vote.
588 0 $aPrint version record.
520 $aThis book proposes a selection model for explaining cross-national variation in economic voting: Rational voters condition the economic vote on whether incumbents are responsible for economic outcomes, because this is the optimal way to identify and elect competent economic managers under conditions of uncertainty. This model explores how political and economic institutions alter the quality of the signal that the previous economy provides about the competence of candidates. The rational economic voter is also attentive to strategic cues regarding the responsibility of parties for economic outcomes and their electoral competitiveness. Theoretical propositions are derived, linking variation in economic and political institutions to variability in economic voting. The authors demonstrate that there is economic voting, and that it varies significantly across political contexts. The data consist of 165 election studies conducted in 19 different countries over a 20-year time period.
650 0 $aVoting$xEconomic aspects.
650 0 $aElections$xEconomic aspects.
650 7 $aPOLITICAL SCIENCE$xPolitical Process$xGeneral.$2bisacsh
650 7 $aPOLITICAL SCIENCE$xPolitical Process$xElections.$2bisacsh
650 7 $aElections$xEconomic aspects.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst00904342
650 7 $aVoting$xEconomic aspects.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst01169239
650 7 $aÖkonomische Theorie der Politik$2gnd
650 7 $aInternationaler Vergleich$2gnd
650 7 $aWahl$2gnd
650 7 $aWahlverhalten$2gnd
650 7 $aWirtschaftliches Verhalten$2gnd
655 0 $aElectronic books.
655 4 $aElectronic books.
700 1 $aStevenson, Randolph T.
776 08 $iPrint version:$aDuch, Raymond M., 1953-$tEconomic vote.$dCambridge, UK ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2008$z9780521881029$z0521881021$w(DLC) 2007026982$w(OCoLC)152560075
830 0 $aPolitical economy of institutions and decisions.
856 40 $3EBSCOhost$uhttps://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=221245
856 40 $uhttps://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511755934$zConnect to e-book
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856 40 $uhttp://0-dx.doi.org.lib.exeter.ac.uk/10.1017/CBO9780511755934$zAvailable via Cambridge Books Online. Please log in using your Exeter IT login, if prompted.
856 40 $3MyiLibrary$uhttp://lib.myilibrary.com?id=125490$zAn electronic book accessible through the World Wide Web; click for access
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856 40 $uhttp://www.vlebooks.com/vleweb/product/openreader?id=none&isbn=9780511382574
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