MARC record from Internet Archive

LEADER: 02673cam 2200337Ka 450
001 001040535
004 001040535
005 20020521092213.0
008 020516e200110 maua rbt 000 0 eng d
035 $a(OCoLC)49800389
040 $aMYG$cMYG
090 $aHB31$b.M415 no.01-40
100 1 $aBasu, Kaushik.
245 10 $aEfficiency pricing, tenancy rental control and monopolistic landlords /$cKaushik Basu [and] Patrick M. Emerson.
260 $aCambridge, MA :$bMassachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics,$c[2001]
300 $a18 p. :$bill. ;$c28 cm.
490 1 $aWorking paper ;$vworking paper no. 01-40
500 $aTitle from cover.
500 $a"October 2001."
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 17-18).
530 $aAbstract in HTML and working paper for download in PDF available via World Wide Web at the Social Science Research Network.
520 3 $aWe consider a model of 'tenancy rent control' where landlords are not allowed to raise the rent on sitting tenants nor to evict them, though they are free to set the nominal rent when taking on a new tenant. If there is any inflation in the economy, landlords prefer to take short-staying tenants. Assuming that there is no way for landlords to tell a tenant's type, an adverse selection problem arises. If in this context, landlords have monopoly power-which, as we argue, is indeed pervasive-then the housing market equilibria can exhibit some unexpected properties. Most strikingly, landlords may prefer not to raise the rent even when there is excess demand for housing. Such rents are labeled "efficiency rents" in this paper and their existence shows that tenancy rent control can give rise to equilibria that look as if there were traditional rent control in which the rent of each unit has a flat ceiling. In other words, tenancy rent control may not achieve the flexibility, which it was expected to impart, to the system of traditional rent control. Keywords: Rent Control, Rent Regulation, Asymmetric Information, Adverse Selection, Monopoly.
700 1 $aEmerson, Patrick.
710 2 $aMassachusetts Institute of Technology.$bDept. of Economics.
856 41 $uhttp://ssrn.com/abstract=290831$zTo download paper, go to the bottom of the abstract page and choose a download option.
830 0 $aWorking paper (Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics) ;$vno. 01-40.
852 0 $bARC$cNOLN2$hHB31.M415 no.01-40$4Institute Archives$5Noncirculating Collection 2
852 0 $bDEW$cSTACK$hHB31.M415 no.01-40$4Dewey Library$5Stacks
852 8 $bNET$zInternet Access$h**See URL(s)$4Internet Resource
049 $aMYGG
994 $a02$bMYG