| Record ID | ia:hassemanticsrest0000wett_n1v0 |
| Source | Internet Archive |
| Download MARC XML | https://archive.org/download/hassemanticsrest0000wett_n1v0/hassemanticsrest0000wett_n1v0_marc.xml |
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008 900928s1991 cau b 001 0 eng
010 $a 90019721
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050 00 $aB840$b.W45 1991
082 00 $a121/.68$220
084 $a08.34$2bcl
100 1 $aWettstein, Howard K.
245 10 $aHas semantics rested on a mistake? :$band other essays /$cHoward K. Wettstein.
260 $aStanford, Calif. :$bStanford University Press,$c1991.
300 $a232 pages ;$c22 cm.
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $aunmediated$bn$2rdamedia
338 $avolume$bnc$2rdacarrier
490 1 $aStanford series in philosophy
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 181-226) and index.
520 $aThe nature of reference, or the relation of a word to the object to which it refers, has been perhaps the dominant concern of twentieth-century analytic philosophy. Extremely influential arguments by Gottlob Frege around the turn of the century convinced the large majority of philosophers that the meaning of a word must be distinguished from its referent, the former only providing some kind of direction for reaching the latter. In the last twenty years, this Fregean orthodoxy has been vigorously challenged by those who argue that certain important kinds of words, at least, refer directly without need of an intermediate meaning or sense. The essays in this volume record how a long-term study of Frege has persuaded the author that Frege's pivotal distinction between sense and reference, and his attendant philosophical views about language and thought, are unsatisfactory. Frege's perspective, he argues, imposes a distinctive way of thinking about semantics, specifically about the centrality of cognitive significance puzzles for semantics. Freed from Frege's perspective, we will no longer find it natural to think about semantics in this way.
600 10 $aFrege, Gottlob,$d1848-1925.
650 0 $aSemantics (Philosophy)
650 0 $aLanguage and languages$xPhilosophy.
650 0 $aReference (Philosophy)
600 16 $aFrege, Gottlob,$d1848-1925.
650 6 $aSe mantique (Philosophie)
650 6 $aRe fe rence (Philosophie)
650 6 $aLangage et langues$xPhilosophie.
600 17 $aFrege, Gottlob,$d1848-1925.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst00044078
650 7 $aLanguage and languages$xPhilosophy.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst00992193
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653 0 $aSemantics
653 0 $aPhilosophy$aLanguage
653 0 $aGermany
830 0 $aStanford series in philosophy.
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