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LEADER: 02738nam 2200385Ka 450
001 001312578
005 20050328081039.0
006 m d
007 cr un-
008 050325e200206 maua bt 000 0 eng d
035 $a(OCoLC)58600919
040 $aMYG$cMYG
090 $aHB31.M415 no.02-27
100 1 $aBanerjee, Abhijit V.
245 10 $aHistory, institutions and economic performance :$bthe legacy of colonial land tenure systems in India /$cAbhijit Banerjee, Lakshmi Iyer.
260 $aCambridge, MA :$bMassachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics,$c[2002]
300 $a29, [22] p. :$bill. ;$c28 cm.
490 1 $aWorking paper series / Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics ;$vworking paper 02-27
500 $a"June 2002."
520 3 $aDo historical institutions have a persistent impact on economic performance? We analyze the colonial institutions set up by the British to collect land revenue in India, and show that differences in historical property rights institutions lead to sustained differences in economic outcomes. Areas in which proprietary rights in land were historically given to landlords have significantly lower agricultural investments, agricultural productivity and investments in public goods in the post-Independence period than areas in which these rights were given to the cultivators. We verify that these differences are not driven by omitted variables or endogeneity of the historical institutions, and argue that they probably arise because differences in institutions lead to very different policy choices.Keywords: History, land tenure, development. JEL Classifications: O11, P16, P51
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 27-29).
530 $aAbstract in HTML and working paper for download in PDF available via World Wide Web at the Social Science Research Network.
700 0 $aLakshmi Iyer.
710 2 $aMassachusetts Institute of Technology.$bDept. of Economics.
830 0 $aWorking paper (Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics) ;$vno. 02-27.
856 41 $uhttp://ssrn.com/abstract=321721$zTo download paper, go to the bottom of the abstract page and choose a download option.
852 0 $bARC$cNOLN2$hHB31.M415 no.02-27$4Institute Archives$5Noncirculating Collection 2
852 0 $bDEW$cSTACK$hHB31.M415 no.02-27$4Dewey Library$5Stacks
852 8 $bNET$zInternet Access$h**See URL(s)$4Internet Resource
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949 0 $av$bARC$cNOLN2$o0$p39080025284842$x02$hHB31.M415 no.02-27
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