MARC record from Internet Archive

LEADER: 04332cam 2200757 a 4500
001 ocm37640628
003 OCoLC
005 20200629022439.0
008 970911s1998 njua b 001 0 eng
010 $a 97041419
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035 $a(OCoLC)37640628$z(OCoLC)1120821134
050 00 $aHM131$b.Y64 1998
080 $a330.116
082 00 $a306$221
084 $a83.15$2bcl
100 1 $aYoung, H. Peyton,$d1945-
245 10 $aIndividual strategy and social structure :$ban evolutionary theory of institutions /$cH. Peyton Young.
260 $aPrinceton, N.J. :$bPrinceton University Press,$c©1998.
300 $axiii, 189 pages :$billustrations ;$c24 cm
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $aunmediated$bn$2rdamedia
338 $avolume$bnc$2rdacarrier
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 177-184) and index.
505 0 $aCh. 1. Overview -- Ch. 2. Learning -- Ch. 3. Dynamic and Stochastic Stability -- Ch. 4. Adaptive Learning in Small Games -- Ch. 5. Variations on the Learning Process -- Ch. 6. Local Interaction -- Ch. 7. Equilibrium and Disequilibrium Selection in General Games -- Ch. 8. Bargaining -- Ch. 9. Contracts -- Ch. 10. Conclusion -- Appendix. Proofs of Selected Theorems.
520 $aPublisher description: Neoclassical economics assumes that people are highly rational and can reason their way through even the most complex economic problems. In Individual Strategy and Social Structure, Peyton Young argues for a more realistic view in which people have a limited understanding of their environment, are sometimes short-sighted, and occasionally act in perverse ways. He shows how the cumulative experiences of many such individuals coalesce over time into customs, norms, and institutions that govern economic and social life. He develops a theory that predicts how such institutions evolve and characterizes their welfare properties. The ideas are illustrated through a variety of examples, including patterns of residential segregation, rules of the road, claims on property, forms of economic contracts, and norms of equity. The book relies on new results in evolutionary game theory and stochastic dynamical systems theory, many of them originated by the author. It can serve as an introductory text, or be read on its own as a contribution to the study of economic and social institutions.
650 0 $aSocial institutions.
650 0 $aInstitutional economics.
650 0 $aEvolutionary economics.
650 0 $aGame theory.
650 6 $aInstitutions sociales.
650 6 $aInstitutionnalisme.
650 6 $aÉvolution économique, Théorie de l'
650 6 $aJeux, Théorie des.
650 7 $aEvolutionary economics.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst00917339
650 7 $aGame theory.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst00937501
650 7 $aInstitutional economics.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst00974297
650 7 $aSocial institutions.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst01122537
650 17 $aInstitutionele economie.$2gtt
650 17 $aSpeltheorie.$2gtt
650 17 $aInstituties.$2gtt
650 7 $aÉconomie évolutionniste.$2ram
650 7 $aInstitutions sociales.$2ram
650 7 $aInstitutionnalisme.$2ram
650 7 $aThéorie des jeux.$2ram
856 41 $3Table of contents$uhttp://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/prin031/97041419.html
856 42 $3Publisher description$uhttp://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/description/prin021/97041419.html
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948 $hNO HOLDINGS IN P4A - 433 OTHER HOLDINGS