MARC record from Internet Archive

LEADER: 05226pam 22003974a 4500
001 9920030850001661
005 20161129132626.0
008 030331s2003 maua b 001 0 eng
010 $a 2003050105
015 $aGBA3-X6997
020 $a1402074107 (hc. : alk. paper)
029 1 $aUKM$bbA3X6997
035 $a(CSdNU)u180544-01national_inst
035 $a(OCoLC)51983446
035 $a(OCoLC)51983446
040 $aDLC$cDLC$dYDX$dUKM$dOHX$dOrPss
042 $apcc
049 $aCNUM
050 00 $aHB144$b.P45 2003
072 7 $aHB$2lcco
082 00 $a519.3$221
100 1 $aPeleg, Bezalel.
245 10 $aIntroduction to the theory of cooperative games /$cby Bezalel Peleg and Peter Sudholter.
260 $aBoston :$bKluwer Academic Publishers,$cc2003.
300 $axvi, 378 p. :$bill. ;$c25 cm.
440 0 $aTheory and decision library.$nSeries C,$pGame theory, mathematical programming, and operations research ;$vv. 34
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 357-369) and indexes.
505 0 $aCooperative Games -- TU Games -- NTU Games -- Axiomatizations -- Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility -- Nash's Program -- TU Games -- Coalitional TU Games and Solutions -- Coalitional Games -- Some Families of Games -- Market Games -- Cost Allocation Games -- Simple Games -- Properties of Solutions -- The Core -- The Bondareva-Shapley Theorem -- An Application to Market Games -- Totally Balanced Games -- Some Families of Totally Balanced Games -- Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Games -- Permutation Games -- A Characterization of Convex Games -- An Axiomatization of the Core -- An Axiomatization of the Core on Market Games -- The Core for Games with Various Coalition Structures -- Bargaining Sets -- The Bargaining Set M -- Existence of the Bargaining Set -- Balanced Superadditive Games and the Bargaining Set -- Further Bargaining Sets -- The Reactive and the Semi-Reactive Bargaining Set -- The Mas-Colell Bargaining Set -- Non-Monotonicity of Bargaining Sets -- The Bargaining Set and Syndication An Example -- The Prekernel, Kernel, and Nucleolus -- The Nucleolus and the Prenucleolus -- The Reduced Game Property -- Desirability, Equal Treatment, and the Prekernel -- An Axiomatization of the Prekernel -- Individual Rationality and the Kernel -- Reasonableness of the Prekernel and the Kernel -- The Prekernel of a Convex Game -- The Prekernel and Syndication -- The Prenucleolus -- A Combinatorial Characterization of the Prenucleolus -- Preliminary Results -- An Axiomatization of the Prenucleolus -- An Axiomatization of the Nucleolus -- The Positive Core -- The Prenucleolus of Games with Coalition Structures -- The Nucleolus of Strong Weighted Majority Games -- The Modiclus -- Constant-Sum Games -- Convex Games -- Weighted Majority Games -- Geometric Properties of the [varepsilon]-Core, Kernel, and Prekernel -- Geometric Properties of the [varepsilon]-Core -- Some Properties of the Least-Core -- The Reasonable Set -- Geometric Characterizations of the Prekernel and Kernel -- A Method for Computing the Prenucleolus -- The Shapley Value -- Existence and Uniqueness of the Value -- Monotonicity Properties of Solutions and the Value -- Consistency -- The Potential of the Shapley Value -- A Reduced Game for the Shapley Value -- The Shapley Value for Simple Games -- Games with Coalition Structures -- Games with a priori Unions -- Multilinear Extensions of Games -- A Summary of some Properties of the Main Solutions -- Continuity Properties of Solutions -- Upper Hemicontinuity of Solutions -- Lower Hemicontinuity of Solutions -- Continuity of the Prenucleolus -- Dynamic Bargaining Procedures for the Kernel -- Dynamic Systems for the Kernel and the Bargaining Set -- Stable Sets of the Kernel and the Bargaining Set -- Asymptotic Stability of the Nucleolus -- NTU Games -- Cooperative Games in Strategic and Coalitional Form -- Cooperative Games in Strategic Form -- [alpha]- and [beta]-Effectiveness -- Coalitional Games with Nontransferable Utility -- Cooperative Games with Side Payments but without TU -- The Core of NTU Games -- Individual Rationality, Pareto Optimality, and the Core -- Balanced NTU Games -- Ordinal and Cardinal Convex Games -- Ordinal Convex Games -- Cardinal Convex Games -- An Axiomatization of the Core -- Reduced Games of NTU Games -- Axioms for the Core -- Proof of Theorem 12.4.8 -- Additional Properties and Characterizations -- Some Values of NTU Games -- The Shapley Value of NTU Games -- A Characterization of the Shapley NTU Value -- The Harsanyi Solution -- The Consistent Shapley Value -- Bargaining Sets for NTU Games -- The Bargaining Set M -- The Ordinal Bargaining Set M[superscript o] -- A Proof of Billera's Theorem -- Solutions Related to M[superscript o] -- The Ordinal (Semi-) Reactive Bargaining Set -- Solutions Related to the Prekernel.
650 0 $aGame theory.
650 0 $aGroup decision making.
650 0 $aCooperation.
700 1 $aSudholter, Peter.
938 $aOtto Harrassowitz$bHARR$nhar035013382$c129.00 EUR
949 $aHB 144 .P45 2003$i31786101571120
994 $a92$bCNU
999 $aHB 144 .P45 2003$wLC$c1$i31786101571120$d3/4/2004$f3/4/2004$g1 $lCIRCSTACKS$mNULS$rY$sY$tBOOK$u11/26/2003