Record ID | ia:kindsofthingsthe0000doep |
Source | Internet Archive |
Download MARC XML | https://archive.org/download/kindsofthingsthe0000doep/kindsofthingsthe0000doep_marc.xml |
Download MARC binary | https://www.archive.org/download/kindsofthingsthe0000doep/kindsofthingsthe0000doep_meta.mrc |
LEADER: 04067cam 2200829 a 4500
001 ocm34974716
003 OCoLC
005 20210720234104.0
008 960528s1996 ilu b 001 0 eng
010 $a 96009228
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035 $a(OCoLC)34974716$z(OCoLC)60180150
050 00 $aBD450$b.D63 1996
082 00 $a126$220
084 $a08.36$2bcl
084 $a5,1$2ssgn
084 $aCC 6020$2rvk
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100 1 $aDoepke, Frederick C.
245 14 $aThe kinds of things :$ba theory of personal identity based on transcendental argument /$cFrederick C. Doepke.
260 $aChicago :$bOpen Court,$c©1996.
300 $axi, 280 pages ;$c24 cm
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $aunmediated$bn$2rdamedia
338 $avolume$bnc$2rdacarrier
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 271-276) and index.
505 0 $aCh. 1. Introduction: What Are We? -- Ch. 2. I Am a Single Thing -- Ch. 3. The Importance of the Metapshysics of Persons -- Ch. 4. The Priority of Continuants -- Ch. 5. The Justification of Individuation -- Ch. 6. Essence As Activity -- Ch. 7. The Constitution Relation -- Ch. 8. Establishing an Essence -- Ch. 9. What We Are.
520 $aWhat are we? Doepke approaches the riddle of personal identity by way of a general theory of identity, and in so doing he challenges the influential Humean view of identity developed in Parfit's Reasons and Persons. We normally think of ourselves and the things around us as objects which persist through fairly long stretches of time. Hume, along with Heraclitus and Buddha, denied this degree of permanence. Doepke argues for a view of the self that is more in harmony with both Kant and common sense. With rigorous arguments, The Kinds of Things strongly supports the commonsense belief that, in normal human life, persons persist: even changes in our deeply-held affections and ideals do not erode the basis of our identity.
600 10 $aKant, Immanuel,$d1724-1804.
600 10 $aHume, David,$d1711-1776.
600 17 $aHume, David,$d1711-1776$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst00035246
600 17 $aKant, Immanuel,$d1724-1804$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst00031763
650 0 $aSelf (Philosophy)
650 0 $aIdentity (Psychology)
650 0 $aIdentity (Philosophical concept)
650 0 $aTranscendental logic.
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650 7 $aSelf (Philosophy)$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst01111454
650 7 $aTranscendental logic.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst01154545
650 17 $aIdentiteit.$2gtt
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650 07 $aIdentität.$0(DE-588)4026482-8$2gnd
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650 07 $aTranszendentale Logik.$0(DE-588)4185946-7$2gnd
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650 07 $aTranszendentale Logik.$2swd
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