MARC record from Internet Archive

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003 OCoLC
005 20200620043906.0
008 041122s2005 maua b 001 0 eng
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050 00 $aB105.M55$bR63 2005
060 00 $a2007 J-191
060 10 $aB 105.M55$bR684n 2005
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100 1 $aRockwell, W. Teed.
245 10 $aNeither brain nor ghost :$ba nondualist alternative to the mind-brain identity theory /$cW. Teed Rockwell.
260 $aCambridge, Mass. :$bMIT Press,$c©2005.
300 $axxii, 231 pages :$billustrations ;$c24 cm
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $aunmediated$bn$2rdamedia
338 $avolume$bnc$2rdacarrier
500 $a"A Bradford book."
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 219-226) and index.
505 00 $tMinds, Brains, and Behavior --$tFunctionalism --$tEliminative Materialism --$tSome Cartesian Materialist Presuppositions --$tRyle's Dispositional Psychology --$tA Rylean Alternative to Functionalist Cartesian Materialism --$tBeyond the Cranium --$tBeyond the Neuronal Mind --$tThe James-Cannon Debate --$tNew Data on the Relationship between the Body and Emotions/Sensations --$tIs Causation Different from Embodiment? --$tCausation and Embodiment --$tMill's Criticism of Atomistic Causality --$tThe Lure of Atomistic Causality --$tMill's Criticism (and the Modern Defense) of Intrinsic Causal Powers --$tThe Myth of the Autonomous Mind-Brain --$tSupervenience, Causation, and Embodiment --$tExperience, Sense Data, and Language: Putting Experience Back into the Environment --$tLanguage and Thought as Biological and Functional Categories --$tSubjective Experience and the Environment --$tMinds, Worlds, and Reality --$tThe Return of the Zombies --$tWhy Physiological Zombies Have Scientific Significance --$tFunctional and Behavioral Zombies --$tThe Roots of the Problem --$tZombies, Experience, and Skepticism --$tThe "Frame Problem" and the "Background" --$tSearle versus Dewey --$tSearle's Intrinsicality Argument --$tSearle's Darwinian Argument --$tDennett's Darwinian Argument: Genes versus Memes --$tDreyfus, Clark, and Conscious Experience --$tDreams, Illusions, and Errors --$tCartesian Materialism and the Empiricists --$tThe Pragmatist Alternative --$tBridge Laws versus New Wave Reductionism --$tThe Pragmatic Answer to Eliminative Skepticism --$tConnectionist Support for Pragmatism.
520 1 $a"Teed Rockwell rejects both dualism and the mind-brain identity theory. He proposes instead that mental phenomena emerge not merely from brain activity but from an interacting nexus of brain, body, and world. The mind can be seen not as an organ within the body, but as a "behavioral field" that fluctuates within this brain-body-world nexus. If we reject the dominant form of the mind-brain identity theory - which Rockwell calls "Cartesian materialism" (distinct from Daniel Dennett's concept of the same name) - and accept this new alternative, then many philosophical and scientific problems can be solved. Other philosophers have flirted with these ideas, including Dewey, Heidegger, Putnam, Millikan, and Dennett.
520 8 $aBut Rockwell goes further than these tentative speculations and offers a detailed alternative to the dominant philosophical view, applying pragmatist insights to contemporary scientific and philosophical problems."
520 8 $a"Rockwell shows that neuroscience no longer supports the mind-brain identity theory because the brain cannot be isolated from the rest of the nervous system; moreover, there is evidence that the mind is hormonal as well as neural. These data, and Rockwell's reanalysis of the concept of causality, show why the borders of mental embodiment cannot be neatly drawn at the skull, or even at the skin. Rockwell then demonstrates how his proposed view of the mind can resolve paradoxes engendered by the mind-brain identity theory in such fields as neuroscience, artificial intelligence, epistemology, and philosophy of language.
520 8 $aFinally, he argues that understanding the mind as a "behavioral field" supports the new cognitive science paradigm of dynamic systems theory (DST)."--Jacket.
650 0 $aMind-brain identity theory.
650 0 $aMind and body.
650 0 $aPragmatism.
650 12 $aPhilosophy.
650 22 $aNeurophysiology.
650 22 $aPsychophysiology.
650 7 $aMind and body.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst01021997
650 7 $aMind-brain identity theory.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst01022009
650 7 $aPragmatism.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst01074582
650 07 $aAlternative.$0(DE-588)4138905-0$2gnd
650 07 $aDualismus.$0(DE-588)4130223-0$2gnd
650 07 $aLeib-Seele-Problem.$0(DE-588)4035151-8$2gnd
650 07 $aPhilosophy of Mind.$0(DE-588)4248301-3$2gnd
650 17 $aLichaam en geest.$2gtt
650 17 $aIdentiteitsbeginsel.$2gtt
650 07 $aLeib-Seele-Problem.$2swd
650 07 $aDualismus.$2swd
650 07 $aAlternative.$2swd
650 07 $aPhilosophy of Mind.$2swd
776 08 $iOnline version:$aRockwell, W. Teed.$tNeither brain nor ghost.$dCambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, ©2005$w(OCoLC)580856580
856 41 $3Table of contents$uhttp://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=014275232&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA
856 41 $uhttp://cognet.mit.edu/library/books/view?isbn=0262182475
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