| Record ID | ia:optimalcollusion00athe |
| Source | Internet Archive |
| Download MARC XML | https://archive.org/download/optimalcollusion00athe/optimalcollusion00athe_marc.xml |
| Download MARC binary | https://www.archive.org/download/optimalcollusion00athe/optimalcollusion00athe_meta.mrc |
LEADER: 01389nam 2200361Ka 450
001 000951359
003 MCM
004 000951359
005 20010609155320.0
008 001019e199910 mau bt 000 0 eng d
035 $aMITb10951359
035 $a(OCoLC)45200025
040 $aMYG$cMYG
090 $aHB31$b.M415 no.99-17
100 1 $aAthey, Susan.
245 10 $aOptimal collusion with private information /$cSusan Athey, Kile Bagwell.
260 $aCambridge, Mass. :$bDept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,$c[1999]
300 $a57 p. ;$c28 cm.
490 1 $aWorking paper / Dept. of Economics ;$vno. 99-17
500 $a"October, 1999."
500 $a"First draft: May, 1998. This draft: September, 1999"--Added t.p.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 55-57).
536 $aSupported in part by the NSF.$cSBR-9631760$cSES-9905460
700 1 $aBagwell, Kyle.
710 2 $aMassachusetts Institute of Technology.$bDept. of Economics.
830 0 $aWorking paper (Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics) ;$vno. 99-17.
852 0 $aMCM$bDEW$cSTACK$hHB31.M415 no.99-17$4Dewey Library$5Stacks
852 0 $aMCM$bARC$cNOLN2$hHB31.M415 no.99-17$z$4Institute Archives$5Noncirculating Collection 2
049 $aMYGG
910 $arch001019.
949 $av$p39080022365040
949 $ad$p39080019183703
994 $a02$bMYG