MARC record from Internet Archive

LEADER: 03004ntm 2200445Ia 4500
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035 $a(OCoLC)122553187
040 $aMYG$cMYG
090 $aHB31.M415 no.07-05
100 1 $aBanerjee, Abhijit V.
245 10 $aPublic action for public goods /$cAbhijit Banerjee, Lakshmi Iyer [and] Rohini Somanathan.
260 $aCambridge, MA :$bMassachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics,$c[2006]
300 $a38, [1] p. :$bill. ;$c28 cm.
490 1 $aWorking paper series / Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics ;$vworking paper 07-05
500 $a"September 30, 2006."
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 33-38).
520 3 $aThis paper focuses on the relationship between public action and access to public goods. It begins by developing a simple model of collective action which is intended to capture the various mechanisms that are discussed in the theoretical literature on collective action. We argue that several of these intuitive theoretical arguments rely on special additional assumptions that are often not made clear. We then review the empirical work based on the predictions of these models of collective action. While the available evidence is generally consistent with these theories, there is a dearth of quality evidence. Moreover, a large part of the variation in access to public goods seems to have nothing to do with the "bottom-up" forces highlighted in these models and instead reflect more "top-down" interventions. We conclude with a discussion of some of the historical evidence on top-down interventions. Keywords: Public goods, collective action. JEL Classifications: H41, 012.
530 $aAbstract in HTML and working paper for download in PDF available via World Wide Web at the Social Science Research Network.
650 0 $aCollective behavior$xMathematical models.
650 0 $aPublic goods.
650 0 $aSelf-interest.
700 0 $aLakshmi Iyer.
700 1 $aSomanathan, Rohini.
710 2 $aMassachusetts Institute of Technology.$bDept. of Economics.
830 0 $aWorking paper (Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics) ;$vno. 07-05.
856 41 $uhttp://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract%5Fid=961497$zTo download paper, go to the bottom of the abstract page choose a download option.
852 0 $bARC$cNOLN2$hHB31.M415 no.07-05$4Institute Archives$5Noncirculating Collection 2
852 0 $bDEW$cSTACK$hHB31.M415 no.07-05$4Dewey Library$5Stacks
852 8 $bNET$zInternet Access$h**See URL(s)$4Internet Resource
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994 $a02$bMYG