| Record ID | ia:reputationequili00fude |
| Source | Internet Archive |
| Download MARC XML | https://archive.org/download/reputationequili00fude/reputationequili00fude_marc.xml |
| Download MARC binary | https://www.archive.org/download/reputationequili00fude/reputationequili00fude_meta.mrc |
LEADER: 01481nam 2200361K 45q0
001 000347555
003 MCM
004 000347555
005 20010608134448.0
008 880407s1987 mau rtb 000 0 eng d
035 $aMITb10347555
035 $a(OCoLC)17747325
035 $aGLIS00347555
040 $cMYG
090 $aHB31$b.M514 no.461
099 $aHB31.M415 no.461
100 1 $aFudenberg, Drew.
245 10 $aReputation and equilibrium selection in games with a patient player /$cDrew Fudenberg, David Levine.
260 $aCambridge, Mass. :$bDept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,$c1987
300 $a32 p. ;$c28 cm.
490 1 $aWorking paper / Dept. of Economics ;$vno. 461
504 $a"References": p. 31-32.
536 $aSupported by the National Science Foundation grant$cSES 85-09697
536 $aSupported by the National Science Foundation grant$cSES 85-09484
536 $aSupported by the Sloan Foundation and UCLA Academic Senate.
700 1 $aLevine, David K.
710 2 $aMassachusetts Institute of Technology.$bDept. of Economics.
830 0 $aWorking paper (Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics) ;$vno. 461.
852 0 $aMCM$bARC$cNOLN2$hHB31.M415 no.461$z$4Institute Archives$5Noncirculating Collection 2
852 0 $aMCM$bDEW$cSTACK$hHB31.M415 no.461$z$4Dewey Library$5Stacks
049 $aMYGV$aMYGD
910 $aLS880407
949 $aMYGV$b3908005130445$aMYGD$b3908005130478$b39080005130452