| Record ID | ia:strategyintroduc003edwats_e3f9 |
| Source | Internet Archive |
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LEADER: 02230cam a2200301 i 4500
001 2013016300
003 DLC
005 20140315082110.0
008 130429s2013 nyua b 001 0 eng
010 $a 2013016300
020 $a9780393918380 (hardcover)
040 $aDLC$beng$cDLC$erda$dDLC
042 $apcc
050 00 $aHB144$b.W37 2013
082 00 $a330.01/5193$223
100 1 $aWatson, Joel.
245 10 $aStrategy :$ban introduction to game theory /$cJoel Watson, University of California, San Diego.
250 $aThird Edition.
264 1 $aNew York :$bW. W. Norton & Company,$c[2013]
300 $axv, 491 pages :$billustrations ;$c24 cm
336 $atext$2rdacontent
337 $aunmediated$2rdamedia
338 $avolume$2rdacarrier
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
505 0 $aPreface -- Introduction -- Representations and basic assumptions -- The extensive form -- Strategies and the normal form -- Beliefs, mixed strategies, and expected payoffs -- General assumptions and methodology -- Analyzing behavior in static settings -- Dominance and best response -- Rationalizability and iterated dominance -- Location, partnership, and social unrest -- Nash equilibrium -- Oligopoly, tariffs, crime, and voting -- Mixed-strategy nash equilibrium -- Strictly competitive games and security strategies -- Contract, law, and enforcement in static settings -- Analyzing behavior in dynamic settings -- Details of the extensive form -- Sequential rationality and subgame perfection -- Topics in industrial organization -- Parlor games -- Bargaining problems -- Analysis of simple bargaining games -- Games with joint decisions negotiation equilibrium -- Unverifiable investment, hold up, options, and ownership -- Repeated games and reputation -- Collusion, trade agreements, and goodwill -- Information -- Random events and incomplete information -- Risk and incentives in contracting -- Bayesian nash equilibrium and rationalizability -- Lemons, auctions, and information aggregation -- Perfect bayesian equilibrium -- Job-market signaling and reputation -- Appendices -- Index.
650 0 $aGame theory.
650 0 $aEconomics$xPsychological aspects.
650 0 $aStrategic planning.