| Record ID | marc_binghamton_univ/bgm_openlib_final_10-15.mrc:412664051:1546 |
| Source | Binghamton University |
| Download Link | /show-records/marc_binghamton_univ/bgm_openlib_final_10-15.mrc:412664051:1546?format=raw |
LEADER: 01546nam 2200277 a 4500
001 BIN01-001358327
005 20071122165835.0
008 850503s1984 caua b 000 0 eng d
035 $a(OCoLC)ocm11994358
035 9 $aAGB2391$bSB
040 $aUIU$cUIU
049 $aBNGG
092 0 $a302.30151$bC849t$219
100 1 $aCramton, Peter C.
245 10 $aTwo papers on sequential bargaining :$bpaper I, sequential bargaining mechanisms, paper II, bargaining with incomplete information, an infinite-horizon model with continuous uncertainty /$cby Peter C. Cramton.
260 $aStanford, Calif. :$bInstitute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford University,$c1984.
300 $a111 p. :$bill. ;$c28 cm.
490 1 $aEconomics series / Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford University
490 1 $aTechnical report / Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford University ;$vno. 444
500 $a"A report of the Center for Research on Organizational Efficiency, Stanford University, Contract ONR-N0014-79-C-0685, United States Office of Naval Research."
504 $aIncludes bibliographies.
650 0 $aNegotiation$xMathematical models.
830 0 $aTechnical report (Stanford University. Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences)$vno. 444.
830 0 $aEconomic series (Stanford University. Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences).
852 00 $aBIN$bBINMA$cMAIN$hH61$iS823 no.444$91
945 $d11/20/00$nNSL jaw 11/20/00