MARC Record from marc_claremont_school_theology

LEADER: 04378cam a2200589Ma 4500
001 ocn759848211
003 OCoLC
005 20200617075112.8
008 950622s1990 enk b 001 0 eng d
040 $aAUD$beng$cAUD$dOCLCQ$dESU$dOCLCO$dOCLCF$dAU@$dCBA$dOCLCO
015 $aGB9128293$2bnb
020 $a0195085655
020 $a9780195085655
020 $a0195056167
020 $a9780195056167
035 $a(OCoLC)759848211
050 00 $aBJ1461$b.W64 1990
082 04 $a123.5$220
084 $a08.38$2bcl
084 $a08.31$2bcl
084 $a89.06$2bcl
084 $aCC 7220$2rvk
084 $a5,1$2ssgn
084 $a123.5$223
049 $aMAIN
100 1 $aWolf, Susan$q(Susan R)
245 10 $aFreedom within reason /$cSusan Wolf.
260 $aOxford :$bOxford University Press,$c1990.
300 $axii, 162 pages ;$c22 cm
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $aunmediated$bn$2rdamedia
338 $avolume$bnc$2rdacarrier
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 155-157) and index.
505 00 $tThe Dilemma of Autonomy (In Which the Problems of Responsibility and Free Will Are Presented) --$tSetting Up the Problem(s): The Dilemma of Autonomy --$tDefending the Problem as a Problem: The Metaphysical Stance --$tThe Real Self View (In Which a Nonautonomous Conception of Free Will and Responsibility is Examined and Criticized) --$tRelating the Problems of Free Will and Responsibility to Determinism --$tAvoiding Autonomy: Developing the Idea of an Agent's Real Self --$tProblems with the Real Self View --$tThe Autonomy View (In Which an Autonomous Conception of Free Will and Responsibility Is Examined and Criticized) --$tThe Apparent (but Only Apparent) Autonomy of Valuing Selves --$tAutonomy as the Ability to Make Radical Choices --$tThe (Non) Desirability of Autonomy --$tA Last Voice in Favor of Autonomy: The Skeptic's Perspective --$tThe Reason View (In Which a Nonautonomous Conception of Free Will and Responsibility Is Proposed) --$tThe Reason View Compared with the Autonomy View --$tThe Reason View Compared with the Real Self View --$tThe Reason View as an Intermediary between the Other Views --$tThe Asymmetry of the Reason View --$tThe Reason View Applied --$tBlameworthiness According to the Reason View --$tThe Unity and Spirit of the Reason View --$tAbility and Possibility (In Which the Implications of Determinism for Responsibility Are Discussed) --$tDeterminism and the Reason View --$tConditional Analyses of Ability --$tAn Alternative Characterization of Ability --$tThe Story --$tThe Moral of the Story.
520 $aPhilosophers typically see the issue of free will and determinism in terms of a debate between two standard positions. Incompatibilism holds that freedom and responsibility require causal and metaphysical independence from the impersonal forces of nature. According to compatibilism, people are free and responsible as long as their actions are governed by their desires. In Freedom Within Reason, Susan Wolf charts a path between these traditional positions: We are not free and responsible, she argues, for actions that are governed by desires that we cannot help having. But the wish to form our own desires from nothing is both futile and arbitrary. Some of the forces beyond our control are friends to freedom rather than enemies of it: they endow us with faculties of reason, perception, and imagination, and provide us with the data by which we come to see and appreciate the world for what it is. The independence we want, Wolf argues, is not independence from the world, but independence from forces that prevent or preclude us from choosing how to live in light of a sufficient appreciation of the world. The freedom we want is a freedom within reason and the world.
590 $bArchive
650 0 $aReason.
650 0 $aEthics.
650 0 $aFree will and determinism.
650 7 $aEthics.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst00915833
650 7 $aFree will and determinism.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst00933968
650 7 $aReason.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst01091272
650 7 $aDeterminismus$2gnd
650 7 $aVernunft$2gnd
650 7 $aWillensfreiheit$2gnd
650 7 $aFreiheit$2gnd
650 7 $aSozialethik$2gnd
650 17 $aVrijheid.$2gtt
650 17 $aVerantwoordelijkheid.$2gtt
856 2 $a940215
994 $a92$bCST
976 $a10017027376