Record ID | marc_columbia/Columbia-extract-20221130-003.mrc:426106965:5817 |
Source | marc_columbia |
Download Link | /show-records/marc_columbia/Columbia-extract-20221130-003.mrc:426106965:5817?format=raw |
LEADER: 05817fam a2200385 a 4500
001 1448606
005 20220602040145.0
008 930122s1993 nyu b 001 0 eng
010 $a 93016212
020 $a0814735061
035 $a(OCoLC)27430133
035 $a(OCoLC)ocm27430133
035 $9AHW9327CU
035 $a(NNC)1448606
035 $a1448606
040 $aDLC$cDLC$dDLC
050 00 $aHB846.8$b.H65 1994
082 00 $a338.9$220
100 1 $aHolcombe, Randall G.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n82121728
245 14 $aThe economic foundations of government /$cRandall G. Holcombe.
260 $aNew York :$bNew York University Press,$c1994.
300 $axiv, 273 pages ;$c22 cm
336 $atext$2rdacontent
337 $aunmediated$2rdamedia
338 $avolume$2rdacarrier
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 259-268) and index.
505 0 $a1. Introduction. Positive versus Normative. Normative Analysis and the Public Sector. Government as an Economic Institution. The Constitutional Foundation of Government. Protection for Tribute: The Fundamental Contract. Other Activities of Government -- 2. The Economic Theory of Rights. Positive and Normative Theories of Rights. The Benefits of Rights. The Origins of Rights. The Historical Origins of Rights. Rights without Government: The Case of Peru. A Semantic Issue Regarding the Definition of Rights. Positive Alternatives to the Economic Theory of Rights. The Utility of Altruism. The Economic Theory and Other Theories. Contractarianism and a Normative Theory of Economic Rights -- 3. Governments and Constitutions. The Exchange Model of Government. Agreement and Exchange in Anarchy. The Exchange of Protection for Tribute. How Well Does the Two-Person Model Extrapolate to Many People? Government as Monopolist. Competition among Potential Governments. Constitutional Rules and Legitimacy.
505 0 $aThe Social Contract. Other Theories of the Social Contract. Normative versus Positive Aspects of the Social Contract. The Characteristics of Constitutions. Constitutions and Monopoly Government -- 4. A Model of Rights and Government. Opportunistic Behavior and Rights. Monitoring and Enforcement. Institutions Do Not Make Rights Unconditional. Institutions and Enforcement. Government and Rights. Military and Police Protection of Rights. A Model of Rights Structures. Comparative Statics. Competition and Exchange -- 5. Distinction between Clubs and Governments. An Economic Theory of Clubs. Clubs and Governments. What is a Government? A Definition of Government. The Reason for Defining Government. Coercion. Constitutions and Mobility -- 6. Government as Monopolist. Competition, Monopoly and Coercion. Natural Monopoly in Government. The Government Cartel. The Competitive Model of Politics. Competition and Special Interests. Barriers to Entry and Monopoly. Seniority as a Barrier to Entry.
505 0 $aPolitical Competition. Government and the Profits from Government. Federalism and Cartels among Governments. Regulation. Corruption. The Secret Ballot -- 7. Institutions and Exchange. Dictatorship and Democracy. Agreement in Politics and in the Marketplace. Lindahl Equilibrium and Agreement. Why is Compromise Necessary in Politics? Cycles and Stability. Large and Small Number Settings. Stability in General Elections and in the Legitimacy. The American Constitution -- 8. Constitutional Evolution. Constitutions as a Constraint on Monopoly Power. The Scope of Constitutional Rules. Constitutional Evolution. Constitutional Evolution and the Division of Labor. Enforcement, Evolution, and Revolution. Legitimacy and Enforcement. Factors that Reduce Legitimacy -- 9. Competition in Politics. Government Exploitation. Intergovernment Competition. Political Competition through Voting. Constitutions as Substitutes for Mobility. Constitutional Rules and Competition. War: The Health of the State.
505 0 $aGovernment Growth and Decline. The Importance of Constitutional Constraints. Constitutional Design. Social Science and Social Engineering -- 10. The Concept of Agreement. Agreement and the Operation of Government. Legitimacy. Legitimacy and Agreement. The Production of Legitimacy. Agreement and Coercion. Ideology. Positive and Normative Agreement. Problems with the Concept of Agreement. Implied Agreement. Implied Agreement in Law. Fictions. Conceptual and Implied Agreement. A Positive Application of Implied Agreement. Normative Application. Conceptual Agreement -- 11. Positive and Normative Theories of Government. Why Normative Theories Require Positive Theories. Contractarianism. Utilitarianism. Act versus Rule Utilitarianism. Distinctions Between Utilitarianism and Contractarians. Disagreements about Facts and Values. Natural Rights. Natural Law. The Role of Fictions -- 12. Political Ethics and Public Policy. Rawlsian Agreement as a Heuristic Device. Wicksellian Agreement. Agreement as a Benchmark.
505 0 $aNon-Pareto Superior Policy Proposals. Problems with Non-Pareto Superior Policy Proposals. The Wicksellian Model of Taxation. Desirability and Feasibility. Legitimacy and Agreement. The Importance of the Status Quo -- 13. Conclusion. The Exchange Model of Government. Clubs and Governments. Constitutional Rules. Constitutions and Competition. Competition and Monopoly in Government. Government by Agreement. Agreement and Public Policy. Desirable Political Institutions. Dimensions of Political Competition. Institutions and Outcomes. Building on the Foundations.
650 0 $aSocial choice.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85123920
650 0 $aEconomic policy.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85040837
650 0 $aFinance, Public.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85048270
852 00 $boff,glx$hHB846.8$i.H65 1994