MARC Record from marc_columbia

LEADER: 04070fam a2200397 a 4500
001 1475935
005 20220602043147.0
008 930518s1994 enk b 000 0 eng
010 $a 93024903
020 $a0198258127 :$c£35.00
035 $a(OCoLC)28212317
035 $a(OCoLC)ocm28212317
035 $9AHZ8373CU
035 $a(NNC)1475935
035 $a1475935
040 $aDLC$cDLC$dNNC
050 00 $aK331$b.W35 1993
082 00 $a340/.1$220
100 1 $aWaluchow, Wilfrid J.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n88669671
245 10 $aInclusive legal positivism /$cW.J. Waluchow.
260 $aOxford :$bClarendon ;$aNew York :$bOxford University Press,$c1994.
263 $a9308
300 $ax, 290 pages ;$c23 cm
336 $atext$2rdacontent
337 $aunmediated$2rdamedia
338 $avolume$2rdacarrier
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
505 0 $a1. Introduction. 1. Indeterminate Boundaries. 2. The Structure of Our Inquiry -- 2. Theories and Conceptions. 1. The Grounds of Law. 2. The Force of Law. 3. Dworkinian Conceptions of Law. 4. Conceptions and Evaluation. 5. Values and Legal Theory -- 3. The Forces of Law. 2. Law, Compliance, and Adjudication. 3. The Institutional Forces of Law. 4. Rights Against Hercules. 5. The Theory of Compliance. 6. Separate But Connected. 7. An Alternative -- 4. Inclusive V. Exclusive Positivism. 1. The Forms and Limits of Positivism. 2. Hart's Arguments. 3. Bentham's Causal/Moral Argument. 4. The Invalidity of Causal/Moral Arguments. 5. A Dubious Causal Connection. 6. The Argument From Intellectual Clarity. 7. Three Popular Arguments. 8. The Argument From Explanatory Power. 9. The Argument From Function. 10. The Authority Argument: An Outline. 11. The Authority Argument: A Critique. 12. Taking Stock -- 5. Charter Challenges. 2. Moral Arguments? 3. Does it Figure in the Right Way?
505 0 $a4. An Alternative Exclusive Account? -- 6. Hercules. 2. The Validity Argument. 3. The Pedigree Argument. 4. The Argument From Function -- 7. Discretion and Legal Theory. 1. The Discretion Argument. 2. Strong and Weak Discretion. 3. Two Interpretations. 4. Two Objections. 5. Having and Exercising Strong Discretion. 6. A Significant Distinction? 7. A Return to the Discretion Argument. 8. Raz's Challenge -- 8. Morals and the Meaning of Laws. 2. Hart's Early Theory. 3. The Necessity Argument. 4. The Desirability Argument. 5. The Intention Argument. 6. The Rule of Law Argument 1. 7. The Rule of Law Argument 2. 8. Later Hart.
520 $aThis book develops a general theory of law, inclusive legal positivism, which seeks to remain within the tradition represented by authors such as Austin, Hart, MacCormick, and Raz, while sharing some of the virtues of both classical and modern theories of natural law, as represented by authors such as Aquinas, Fuller, Finnis, and Dworkin. Its central theoretical questions are: Does the existence or content of positive law ever depend on moral considerations?
520 8 $aIf so, is this fact consistent with legal positivism? The author shows how inclusive positivism allows one to answer yes to both of these questions.
520 8 $a.
520 8 $aIn addition to articulating and defending his own version of legal positivism, which is a refinement and development of the views of H.L.A. Hart as expressed in his classic book The Concept of Law, the author clarifies the terms of current jurisprudential debates about the nature of law. These debates are often clouded by failures to appreciate that different theorists are offering differing kinds of theories and attempting to answer different questions.
520 8 $aThere is also a failure, principally on the part of Ronald Dworkin, to characterize opposing theories correctly. The clarity of Waluchow's work will help to remove the confusion which has hitherto marred some jurisprudential debate, particularly about Dworkin's work.
650 0 $aLegal positivism.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85075766
852 00 $bglx$hK331$i.W35 1994