MARC Record from marc_columbia

LEADER: 03998fam a2200469 a 4500
001 1479444
005 20220602043548.0
008 930818t19941994njua b 001 0 eng
010 $a 93034315
020 $a0691032246 :$c$45.00
035 $a(OCoLC)28722560
035 $a(OCoLC)ocm28722560
035 $9AJA6857CU
035 $a(NNC)1479444
035 $a1479444
040 $aDLC$cDLC$dNNC
043 $ae-uk---$ae-fr---$an-us---
050 00 $aHF1533$b.V47 1994
082 00 $a382/.3/0941$220
100 1 $aVerdier, Daniel,$d1954-$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n93080415
245 10 $aDemocracy and international trade :$bBritain, France, and the United States, 1860-1990 /$cDaniel Verdier.
260 $aPrinceton :$bPrinceton University Press,$c[1994], ©1994.
263 $a9404
300 $axx, 387 pages :$billustrations ;$c25 cm
336 $atext$2rdacontent
337 $aunmediated$2rdamedia
338 $avolume$2rdacarrier
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. [345]-369) and index.
505 0 $a1. Trade and the Voter: A Survey of the Existing Literature -- 2. The Electoral Regulation of Access -- 3. The Trade Policy Process: A Typology -- 4. Origins of the Trade Policy Process -- 5. The Making of Trade Policy -- 6. The Case Studies -- 7. Descent into Depression, 1860-86 -- 8. Crisis and Response, 1887-1913 -- 9. First World War, 1914-18 -- 10. Tariff-Making and State-Building, 1919-39 -- 11. Creation of the Cold War Trading Regime, 1940-62 -- 12. The Rise and Fall of Industrial Policy, 1963-89 -- Epilogue: Collapse of the Soviet Union and the Future of Existing Arrangements, 1990 to the Present -- 13. Conclusion -- Appendix One: Mathematical Appendix to Chapter Two -- Appendix Two: Tariff Levels -- Appendix Three: Partisan Bias in Voting on Trade Bills.
520 $aIn this ambitious exploration of how foreign trade policy is made in democratic regimes, Daniel Verdier casts doubt on theories that neglect voters. Bringing the voters back in, Verdier shows that special interests, party ideologues, and state officials and diplomats act as agents of the voters.
520 8 $aConstructing a general theory in which existing theories (rent seeking, median voting, state autonomy) function as partial explanations, he shows that trade institutions are not fixed entities but products of political competition.
520 8 $aVerdier then offers a thorough analysis of how foreign trade policy was made in France, Britain, and the United States during the period from 1860 through 1990. He discloses a reality startlingly different from previous understandings of American and French trade policies. Challenging the conventional view that special interests have dominated American trade policy, he argues that sectoral economic weight has not been a good predictor of political power in the United States since 1888.
520 8 $aConversely, against the prevailing belief that French industry is controlled by an autonomous state, he reveals the existence of a privileged, collusive relationship between French industry and state officials from the 1892 Meline Tariff through the Socialist victory of 1981. The standard opinion is confirmed only in the case of Britain, where an arm's-length relationship has historically been maintained between industry and government.
520 8 $aThe book's findings make it essential reading for political scientists, political economists, and historians alike.
651 0 $aGreat Britain$xCommercial policy$xHistory.
651 0 $aFrance$xCommercial policy$xHistory.
651 0 $aUnited States$xCommercial policy$xHistory.
650 0 $aDemocracy$zGreat Britain.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2009123124
650 0 $aDemocracy$zFrance.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2008102170
650 0 $aDemocracy$zUnited States.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2008102152
852 00 $boff,bus$hHF1533$i.V47 1994
852 00 $bleh$hHF1533$i.V47 1994