MARC Record from marc_columbia

LEADER: 03576fam a2200409 a 4500
001 1526851
005 20220602053735.0
008 940225s1994 mau b 001 0 eng
010 $a 94008625
020 $a0674341198 (acid-free paper)
035 $a(OCoLC)30035625
035 $a(OCoLC)ocm30035625
035 $9AJZ0766CU
035 $a(NNC)1526851
035 $a1526851
040 $aDLC$cDLC$dNNC
050 00 $aK212$b.B35 1994
082 00 $a340/.1$220
100 1 $aBaird, Douglas G.,$d1953-$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n83129780
245 10 $aGame theory and the law /$cDouglas G. Baird, Robert H. Gertner, Randal C. Picker.
260 $aCambridge, Mass. :$bHarvard University Press,$c1994.
263 $a9410
300 $axii, 330 pages ;$c24 cm
336 $atext$2rdacontent
337 $aunmediated$2rdamedia
338 $avolume$2rdacarrier
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
505 0 $aIntroduction: Understanding Strategic Behavior -- 1. Simultaneous Decisionmaking and the Normal Form Game. The Normal Form Game. Using Different Games to Compare Legal Regimes. The Nash Equilibrium. Civil Liability, Accident Law, and Strategic Behavior. Legal Rules and the Idea of Strict Dominance. Collective Action Problems and the Two-by-Two Game. The Problem of Multiple Nash Equilibria -- 2. Dynamic Interaction and the Extensive Form Game. The Extensive Form Game and Backwards Induction. A Dynamic Model of Preemption and Strategic Commitment. Subgame Perfection -- 3. Information Revelation, Disclosure Laws, and Renegotiation. Incorporating Beliefs into the Solution Concept. The Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium Solution Concept. Verifiable Information, Voluntary Disclosure, and the Unraveling Result. Disclosure Laws and the Limits of Unraveling. Observable Information, Norms, and the Problem of Renegotiation. Optimal Incentives and the Need for Renegotiation.
505 0 $aLimiting the Ability of Parties to Renegotiate -- 4. Signaling, Screening, and Nonverifiable Information. Signaling and Screening. Modeling Nonverifiable Information. Signals and the Effects of Legal Rules. Information Revelation and Contract Default Rules. Screening and the Role of Legal Rules -- 5. Reputation and Repeated Games. Backwards Induction and Its Limits. Infinitely Repeated Games, Tacit Collusion, and Folk Theorems. Reputation, Predation, and Cooperation -- 6. Collective Action, Embedded Games, and the Limits of Simple Models. Collective Action and the Role of Law. Embedded Games. Understanding the Structure of Large Games. Collective Action and Private Information. Collective Action Problems in Sequential Decisionmaking. Herd Behavior -- 7. Noncooperative Bargaining. Modeling the Division of Gains from Trade. Legal Rules as Exit Options. Bargaining and Corporate Reorganizations. Collective Bargaining and Exit Options -- 8. Bargaining and Information. Basic Models of the Litigation Process.
505 0 $aModeling Separate Trials for Liability and Damages. Information and Selection Bias. Discovery Rules and Verifiable Information -- Conclusion: Information and the Limits of Law.
650 0 $aLaw$xMethodology.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85075137
650 0 $aGame theory.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85052941
700 1 $aGertner, Robert H.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n94018646
700 1 $aPicker, Randal C.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n94018652
852 00 $bleh$hK212$i.B35 1994
852 00 $bleh$hK212$i.B35 1994
852 00 $bleh$hK212$i.B35 1994