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MARC Record from marc_columbia

Record ID marc_columbia/Columbia-extract-20221130-004.mrc:424435928:2097
Source marc_columbia
Download Link /show-records/marc_columbia/Columbia-extract-20221130-004.mrc:424435928:2097?format=raw

LEADER: 02097fam a2200361 a 4500
001 1828886
005 20220609004406.0
008 951012s1996 nyua b 001 0 eng
010 $a 95025932
020 $a0521554713
020 $a0521555833 (pbk.)
035 $a(OCoLC)503402278
035 $a(OCoLC)ocn503402278
035 $9ALR0611CU
035 $a(NNC)1828886
035 $a1828886
040 $aDLC$cDLC$dNNC$dOrLoB-B
050 00 $aJC336$b.S49 1996
082 00 $a320.1/1$220
100 1 $aSkyrms, Brian.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n79123599
245 10 $aEvolution of the social contract /$cBrian Skyrms.
260 $aNew York, NY :$bCambridge University Press,$c1996.
263 $a9607
300 $axiii, 146 pages :$billustrations ;$c22 cm
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $aunmediated$bn$2rdamedia
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 129-142) and index.
505 00 $g1.$tSex and Justice --$g2.$tCommitment --$g3.$tMutual Aid --$g4.$tCorrelated Convention --$g5.$tThe Evolution of Meaning.
520 $aIn this pithy and highly readable book, Brian Skyrms, a recognized authority on game theory and decision theory, investigates traditional problems of the social contract in terms of evolutionary dynamics. Game theory is skillfully employed to offer quite new interpretations of a wide variety of social phenomena, including justice, mutual aid, commitment, convention, and meaning.
520 8 $aThe author eschews any grand, unified theory. Rather, he presents the reader with tools drawn from evolutionary game theory for the purpose of analyzing and coming to understand the social contract. The book is not technical and requires no special background knowledge. As such, it could be enjoyed by students and professionals in a wide range of disciplines: political science, philosophy, decision theory, economics and biology.
650 0 $aSocial contract.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85123930
650 0 $aGame theory.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85052941
852 00 $bglx$hJC336$i.S49 1996