MARC Record from marc_columbia

LEADER: 03457fam a2200409 a 4500
001 1880420
005 20220609015024.0
008 960709s1996 cou b 001 0 eng
010 $a 96032285
020 $a0813380413
020 $a0813380421 (pbk.)
035 $a(OCoLC)35103374
035 $a(OCoLC)ocm35103374
035 $9ALW9371CU
035 $a(NNC)1880420
035 $a1880420
040 $aDLC$cDLC$dNNC$dOrLoB-B
043 $ad------
050 00 $aHC59.7$b.S556 1996
082 00 $a338.9/009172/4$220
100 1 $aSnider, Lewis W.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n78010980
245 10 $aGrowth, debt, and politics :$beconomic adjustment and the political performance of developing countries /$cLewis W. Snider.
260 $aBoulder, CO :$bWestview Press,$c1996.
263 $a9609
300 $axiii, 242 pages ;$c24 cm
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $aunmediated$bn$2rdamedia
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
505 00 $g1.$tIntroduction: The Political Crisis of Economic Adjustment --$g2.$tComparing the Political Strength of Nations --$g3.$tInstitutional Credibility and the Political Costs of Market Transactions --$g4.$tPolitical Regime and Economic Adjustment: Can the Democracies Do It Better? --$g5.$tAfter Primary Import Substitution: Political Capacity and the Choice of Follow-on Industrialization Strategies --$g6.$tEconomic Orthodoxy and Political Power --$g7.$tConclusions.
520 $aWhy have so many attempts by developing countries to correct their financial insolvency by economic adjustment failed even when those nations have adhered closely to the "orthodox" economic prescriptions dispensed by the International Monetary Fund? Does the fault lie in policies that are poorly conceived or implemented haphazardly or in too much government intervention in the economy?
520 8 $aIn this fascinating book, Lewis Snider convincingly argues the opposite - that problems arise not because the government is involved but because the way it intervenes is often counter-productive. In addition, he contends that political weakness, rather than misconceived policies or the inability of policymakers to foresee the consequences of their decisions, most often prevents leaders from successfully implementing economic reforms.
520 8 $aSnider's analysis focuses on three problems common to poor countries: an inability to extract sufficient resources from society; a lack of credible political and economic institutions; and as a natural outcome of these two, covert income and profit transfers that in turn serve to reinforce the institutional credibility problem.
520 8 $aHow can this vicious circle be broken? Drawing on examples and evidence from around the world, Snider demonstrates that the state must first improve its institutional credibility in the form of secure property rights and reliable contract enforcement. Only then will it be able to increase its extraction while holding down transaction costs at the level necessary for economic adjustment to succeed.
650 0 $aEconomic stabilization$zDeveloping countries.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2008102594
651 0 $aDeveloping countries$xEconomic policy.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2008102080
651 0 $aDeveloping countries$xPolitics and government.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2008102163
852 00 $bleh$hHC59.7$i.S556 1996